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DRAFT

CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INC.
John Rappaport*
To what extent can criminal justice be privatized? In the past decade,
major retailers nationwide have begun to employ a private, for-profit
system to settle criminal disputes. This Article examines what their
decisions reveal about our public system of criminal justice and the
concerns of the agents who populate it, the victims who rely on it, and
the suspects whose lives it alters. The private policing of commercial
spaces is well known, as is private incarceration of convicted offenders.
This Article is the first, however, to document how private industry
has penetrated new parts of the criminal process, administering
deterrent sanctions to resolve thousands of shoplifting allegations each
year.
Proponents of private justice claim that everyone wins. Critics (and
the only court to opine so far) say it’s blackmail. The Article takes a
tentative middle ground: while “retail justice” is not the American
ideal, it nonetheless may be preferable to public criminal justice, at
least if certain conditions are met. This is because private justice
subsists upon—and appears to mitigate—the severity of the public
justice system.
Indeed, cast in the light of public authorities’
acquiescence, private justice can be seen as a novel form of
decriminalization. Rather than cancel the private justice experiment,
therefore, as one court is poised to do, the state should aim to foster
optimal conditions for its success.
The Article makes several
recommendations to that end.
Extending the central analysis, the Article then shows how the study of
private justice leads to fresh perspectives on some important criminal
justice issues. It suggests, for example, that the costs to crime victims
of assisting the prosecution may be a feature of the system, not a bug, if
they encourage victims to invest in efficient crime-deterring
precautions. It also complicates legal academic models of police and
prosecutorial behavior built on maximizing arrests and convictions.
The Article concludes by identifying conditions that conduce to private
criminal justice and speculating about the next frontiers.

*

Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
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INTRODUCTION
Most shoplifters evade detection. And many of those who are
caught are never punished. For decades, retailers have relied on a
mixture of formal law enforcement and informal self-help—sending
some suspected shoplifters to the police and others to the curb.
Recently, a third option has emerged, raising serious questions about
the interplay between public and private forces in American criminal
justice. Retailers today can, in effect, assign their criminal complaints
to a for-profit, specialist corporation like the Corrective Education
Company (CEC).1 This “retail justice company” extracts payment from
the alleged offender in exchange for a “restorative justice” course and a
promise not to call the police. The retailer pays nothing; in fact, in
some cases, it reaps a portion of each suspect’s payment.
“Retail justice” is becoming a big business. CEC’s clients, for
example, have included Walmart, Abercrombie & Fitch, Bloomingdales,
DSW, and Burlington Coat Factory. CEC reports an enrollment rate of
roughly ninety percent, yielding thousands of “students” each year. It
offers discounts and payment plans for suspects who cannot finance the
entire $400-500 fee at once and “scholarships” for the poorest few. CEC
claims its program saves retailers time and money, relieves pressure on
an overburdened criminal justice system, and cuts recidivism by
providing “life skills and motivation for reintegration.”2 The City of San
Francisco, in contrast, alleges that CEC is little more than an extortion
racket preying on the City’s residents.3
There is no scholarly treatment, legal or otherwise, of this private
“retail justice system.” Meanwhile, rhetoric imagining a state monopoly
over enforcement of the criminal law persists.4 This supposed monopoly
For a detailed description of CEC and one of its main competitors, with
supporting sources, see infra Section I.C.
2 CEC, https://www.correctiveeducation.com (last visited Aug. 7, 2017).
3 See Complaint at 3, People ex rel. Herrera v. Corrective Education Co., No.
CGC-15-549094 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Nov. 23, 2015).
4 See, e.g., STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 84-88
(2012) (discussing “the state’s monopoly on criminal justice”); Adam B. Cox,
Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of Immigration Law, 2012 SUP. CT. REV.
31, 35 (“[T]here are parts of the criminal law where a single state actor … has a
meaningful monopoly on enforcement within a particular jurisdiction.”); Dan M.
Kahan, Privatizing Criminal Law: Strategies for Private Norm Enforcement in the
Inner City, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1859, 1859 (1999) (“We are accustomed to seeing
criminal law enforcement as an exclusive state prerogative.”); William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 30
(1975) (“With few exceptions, there is a public monopoly—more precisely a series of
public monopolies—of criminal-law enforcement.”); Ric Simmons, Private Criminal
Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 918 (2007) (“[T]he provisioning of criminal
1
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is itself of relatively recent vintage. 5 And it’s never been absolute:
consider, for example, the local diner that lets the neighborhood vandal
repay his debt by washing dishes, 6 or, less sanguine, the nation’s
history of violent vigilantism.7 What is novel here, however, is the way
that “private justice” has become routinized and institutionalized in a
mass, for-profit industry, with buy-in from criminal justice actors.
Seminal work by Elizabeth Joh, Ric Simmons, David Sklansky, and
others has documented the extent to which “private police” prevent and
investigate crime and apprehend suspected offenders. 8 Separate
research plumbs the private prison industry. 9 But private criminal
adjudication and sanctions are terra incognita—or maybe El Dorado,
mythical altogether.10 “Shopkeepers do not always report those they
have caught,” one recent article begins, “but we have never heard of a
shoplifter and storekeeper agreeing to a payment beyond restitution to
settle the matter confidentially.” 11 CEC and its competitors, on the
storekeeper’s behalf, do precisely that.
justice services, at least beyond the field of law enforcement, remains the exclusive
province of the state.”).
5 See Simmons, supra note __, at 921-23, 971 (describing the historical
evolution from private to public criminal law enforcement).
6 See generally Ric Simmons, Private Plea Bargains, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1131
(2011) (discussing various types of informal private bargaining between criminal
offenders and victims).
7 See, e.g., EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
IN THE 19TH CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH (1984); RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, STRAIN
OF VIOLENCE: HISTORICAL STUDIES OF AMERICAN VIOLENCE AND VIGILANTISM (1975).
8 See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, 2005 UTAH L.
REV. 573 [hereinafter Joh, Conceptualizing]; Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of
Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49 (2004) [hereinafter Joh,
Paradox]; Simmons, supra note __; David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1165 (1999).
9 See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE
L.J. 437 (2005); Malcolm M. Feeley, The Unconvincing Case Against Private
Prisons, 89 IND. L.J. 1401 (2014).
10 “In the 16th and 17th centuries, Europeans believed that somewhere in the
New World was a place of immense wealth known as El Dorado.” Willie Drye, El
Dorado, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, http://www.nationalgeographic.com/archaeology-andhistory/archaeology/el-dorado (last visited Sept. 2, 2017).
11 Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, Semi-Confidential Settlements in Civil,
Criminal, and Sexual Assault Cases, 103 CORNELL L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2921059; see also, e.g., Simmons, supra note __ (asserting
that “[p]rivate criminal law … is currently limited to the law enforcement stage of
the process,” id. at 911, and that “private entities perform … none of the
adjudication and almost none of the dispositions in the criminal justice system,” id.
at 936); Sklansky, supra note __, at 1277 (“If we know little about the private
police, we know even less about private adjudication.”).
One seemingly
authoritative volume on “privatizing the United States justice system” is divided
into three parts: police, adjudication, and corrections. While the sections on police
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The Article begins, then, as a case study in the routinized, private
settlement of a particular type of criminal dispute. The subject
offense—shoplifting—is a minor one with “major economic and social
consequences.” 12 The New York Times has called shoplifting “the
nation’s most expensive crime.” 13 Retailers’ losses from shoplifting
approached $18 billion in 2016, or almost $50 million every day.14 The
effects of shoplifting reach both far and deep. At least one in nine
Americans shoplifts at some point in his lifetime; 15 more than ten
million people have been picked up in the last five years alone. 16
Shoplifting is a “crime of moral turpitude” that can catalyze exclusion
or deportation for a non-citizen offender.17 And it famously triggered a
life term for Gary Ewing, who left a municipal golf course pro shop with
a trio of clubs tucked inside his pants leg.18
In addition to its parochial significance, this private justice industry
raises and informs broader questions of legal theory and practice. The
Article travels from the local to the global across four parts. Part I
begins with a social history of shoplifting and review of the pertinent
and corrections are predictably rich, the brief section on adjudication contains only
two pages touching on criminal law, which propose that crime victims be permitted
to hire attorneys to assist the prosecution. See Tim Valentine, Private Prosecution,
in PRIVATIZING THE UNITED STATES JUSTICE SYSTEM (Gary W. Bowman et al. eds.,
1992).
12 See, e.g., Paul Cromwell & Brian Withrow, The Dynamics of Petty Crime: An
Analysis of Motivations To Shoplift, in CRIME TYPES 242, 243 (Dean A. Dabney ed.,
2d ed. 2013) (arguing that shoplifting “should be more widely and systematically
studied”).
13 Susan Konig, Helping Shoplifters To Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1996; see
also RACHEL SHTEIR, THE STEAL: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF SHOPLIFTING 93 (2011)
(calling shoplifting “one of the ‘most common but least reported crimes’ in the
world” (quoting criminologist Ronald V. Clarke)).
14 See RICHARD HOLLINGER & NAT’L RETAIL FED’N, THE 2016 NATIONAL RETAIL
SECURITY SURVEY 7, 9 (2016), https://nrf.com/resources/retail-library/nationalretail-security-survey-2016.
15 Carlos Blanco et al., Prevalence and Correlates of Shoplifting in the United
States: Results from the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related
Conditions (NESARC), 165 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 905, 909 (2008); see id. at 911
(advising that this estimate “may represent a lower boundary of the true
prevalence of shoplifting”).
16
Shoplifting Statistics, NAT’L ASS’N FOR SHOPLIFTING PREVENTION,
http://www.shopliftingprevention.org/what-we-do/learning-resource-center/
statistics (last visited July 27, 2017).
17 See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2002, at B7; John E. Hogan &
Amy B. Herbold, Collateral Consequences: The Potential for Deportation and
Exclusion as a Result of a Municipal Court Shoplifting Conviction, N.J. LAW., Dec.
2010, at 25.
18 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding a 25-to-life sentence
under California’s recidivist statute).

9-Dec-17]

CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INC.

4

criminological literature. The focus is on who offends, why they do it,
and how industry and the legal system have traditionally responded.
Each of these inquiries informs the normative analysis that follows in
Part II: the “who” identifies the population principally affected by retail
justice, necessary, among other things, to weigh distributive effects; the
“why” helps predict how shoplifters would likely react to various
deterrent measures; and the “how” reveals the baseline against which
to evaluate retail justice. Part I then details how retail justice
companies have changed the game of shoplifting enforcement.
Part II conducts an initial evaluation of the retail justice system.
Judging by the tone of media coverage, some readers, I suspect, will
hate the entire concept. Likewise, the sole judicial decision on point
characterizes the “irreducible core of CEC’s program” as “textbook
extortion under California law.” 19 When I first encountered retail
justice in the popular press, I shared some of these impulses. Deeper
reflection, however, has dulled this reflexive response.
The “criminal compromise agreement” (or “restorative justice
agreement”) the parties sign is a contract that, according to the
standard Pareto assumption, should make them better off. The Pareto
assumption fails, however, where the conditions for efficient contracting
are absent—if suspects are coerced or misinformed, for example, or if
negative externalities, such as insufficient (or inefficient) general
deterrence, result. Part II exhaustively—yet tentatively, given the
state of our knowledge about the evolving industry—analyzes these
potential “market failures,” sidelining some and flagging others for
lawmakers’ attention. Part II also considers the potential distributive
effects of retail justice—whether we should expect its harms and
benefits to be visited equally upon different social groups. Part II’s
recurring theme is that, while retail justice may not be ideal, it may be
preferable to criminal justice nonetheless. Private justice, in fact, is the
predictable result of, and a potential palliative for, aggressive policing
and harsh criminal penalties. Part II concludes by explaining why
justifications for prohibiting blackmail do not support a ban on retail
justice.
The upshot of Part II is that the normative valence of retail justice
depends upon empirical facts about its implementation and the
environments in which it operates. Rather than ignoring retail justice
or trying to stamp it out, lawmakers can direct their efforts to ensuring
that it works fairly and efficiently. Part III makes recommendations
toward this end, focused on retail justice companies’ communication

People ex rel. Herrera v. Corrective Education Co., No. CGC-15-549094, slip
op. at 3 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug. 14, 2017) (order granting summary judgment in part).
19
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with suspects, retailers’ crime-prevention initiatives, and the collection
and reporting of aggregate crime data that retail justice masks.
Part IV extends. It demonstrates how the study of private justice
generates fresh perspectives on important criminal justice issues, such
as the understudied role victims play in preventing crime.20 Well-oiled
criminal justice institutions, the Article contends, may actually
discourage some victims from investing in socially desirable crimedeterring precautions. In other words, we may want the criminal
justice system to be costly for victims where it would be cheaper for
victims to prevent crime by taking precautions than for the public
authorities to capture and punish offenders.
We also want to
concentrate public resources where they won’t reduce private incentives
to take precautions, such as where victims cannot afford precautions or
will suffer irreparable harm from crime, and thus will purchase
precautions regardless of public enforcement.
Part IV also highlights what retail justice teaches us about police
and prosecutorial preferences. Some critics claim that private justice
usurps the prosecutor’s charging prerogative.
Yet retail justice
companies operate with the knowledge and (at least tacit) approval of
criminal justice authorities. Where retail justice reigns, prosecutors
still exercise discretion—they simply do so at a wholesale rather than
retail level. The arrangement resembles decriminalization more than
abdication. That prosecutors are willing to forego so many easy cases,
moreover, complicates academic models of prosecutors as conviction- (or
conviction-rate-) maximizing actors.21 The same is true for police and
arrests.22
20 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, The Economics of the Law of Criminal
Attempts: A Victim-Centered Perspective, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 299, 303-08 (1996)
(criticizing legal scholarship’s “perpetrator-centered perspective”).
21 See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH 48-49 (2003); Albert
W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 10607 (1968); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2471 (2004); Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA.
L. REV. 1117, 1128 (2008); George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7
SW. U.L. REV. 98, 114 (1975); Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, The Political
Economy of Prosecution, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 135, 143 (2009); Alissa Pollitz
Worden, Policymaking by Prosecutors: The Uses of Discretion in Regulating Plea
Bargaining, 73 JUDICATURE 335, 337 (1990); Robert L. Rabin, Agency Criminal
Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 24
STAN. L. REV. 1036, 1045, 1071 (1972); Eric Rasmusen et al., Convictions Versus
Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor’s Choice, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 47, 51 (2009);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J.
LEGAL STUD. 43, 50-51 (1988). Other models assume that prosecutors seek to
maximize sentence-years. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Oren Gazal Ayal, Plea
Bargains Only for the Guilty, 49 J.L. & ECON. 353, 357 (2006); Richard T. Boylan,
What Do Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence from the Careers of U.S. Attorneys, 7 AM.
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Finally, Part IV begins to generalize and speculates about the future
of private justice. CEC’s ambitious “vision is to reinvent the way crimes
are handled, starting with retail theft.” 23 Part IV considers the
conditions that conduce to a model of “offender-funded” private justice
like CEC’s, to start to identify where else the model might work. An
“offender-funded” model is best supported, I argue, where a small
number of victims each suffers a large number of low-level, non-violent
harms, and the existing options for deterring those harms are flawed. I
also suggest that other large institutions, like universities and
employers, might support a distinct model of private justice in which
they outsource adjudication rather than sanctions.
In the end, understanding private justice sharpens our view of the
criminal justice system. And understanding the criminal justice
system—in all its manifold institutions, including the unconventional
ones at its margins—is an essential step toward fixing it.24 To be sure,
private justice sits uncomfortably in the contemporary criminal justice
landscape. Its ends, however, may turn out to justify its means. After
all, the public system’s severity is the private alternative’s sustenance.
The way out of private justice, for those who so desire, is not to squelch
it but to starve it. Mollifying the criminal justice system would reduce

L. & ECON. REV. 379 (2005); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the
Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 63 (1971); Jennifer F. Reinganum, Sentencing
Guidelines, Judicial Discretion, and Plea Bargaining, 31 RAND J. ECON. 62, 69
(2000).
22 See, e.g., INIMAI CHETTIAR ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, REFORMING
FUNDING
TO
REDUCE
MASS
INCARCERATION
24-25
(2013),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/REFORM_FUND_
MASS_INCARC_web_0.pdf; Stephanos Bibas, Improve, Dynamite, or Dissolve the
Criminal Regulatory State?, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 61, 61
(Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017); Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt,
Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not To Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 1655, 1695 (2010); Stephen D. Mastrofski et al., Expectancy Theory and Police
Productivity in DUI Enforcement, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 113, 117 (1994); Elina
Treyger, Collateral Incentives To Arrest, 63 KANSAS L. REV. 557, 564 (2015); cf.
Dhammika Dharmapala et al., Punitive Police? Agency Costs, Law Enforcement,
and Criminal Procedure, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (2016) (developing a model
showing that police officers have unusually strong preferences for punishment, and
thus derive utility from making arrests).
23 Appellant’s Opening Brief at *11, People ex rel. Herrera v. Corrective
Education Co., No. A149195, 2017 WL 1366020 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2017), 2016
WL 6037455 (emphasis added).
24 See Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff, Mapping the New Criminal
Justice Thinking, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING, supra note __, at 1 (“If
we are to fix the current criminal system … we need a complete and nuanced
understanding of what exactly this system is: What social and political institutions,
what laws and policies, does it encompass?”).
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both suspects’ demand for private alternatives and the ability of private
intermediaries to extract rents in the form of hush money.
I. THE PATH TO PRIVATE JUSTICE
Leading economic and criminological theories struggle to explain the
incidence of shoplifting because, unlike many crimes, shoplifting
steamrolls race, class, age, and gender lines.25 I thus begin, in Section
A, with a brief social history of shoplifting and overview of the
criminological literature, to sketch out a sense of who shoplifts and
why. This discussion identifies the individuals potentially affected by
retail justice and helps to predict how they will react to the incentives
retail justice, or its alternatives, provide. In Section B, I describe how
retailers and criminal justice authorities have traditionally responded
to shoplifting, isolating the baseline against which to evaluate retail
justice. In Section C, I detail how retail justice works and what it
claims to accomplish.
A. Who Shoplifts, and Why?
A caveat is required at the outset. It is difficult to determine, at any
point in history, who is shoplifting and how much. Experts draw
inferences from three imperfect sources: store apprehension statistics,
criminal justice data, and self-report studies. Changes in the first two
measures may reflect shifts in either commission or detection of
shoplifting.
Self-report studies may be more reliable, though
respondents’ incentives to over- or underreport may vary with cultural
norms (over time or among social groups) or even the manner in which
a survey is administered.26
Specifically, every era since the 1870s has experienced a supposed
shoplifting “epidemic.” 27 Yet it is unclear, in each period, whether
people were shoplifting more or retailers were catching them more
often. Similar difficulties plague the “who” question: there is a “range
and variety of selective factors that bring about the [apprehension] of a
shoplifter and perhaps bring him to official attention.” 28 As one
See Cromwell & Withrow, supra note __, at 242.
See LLOYD W. KLEMKE, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SHOPLIFTING: BOOSTERS AND
SNITCHES TODAY 7-9, 34-37 (1992).
27 Id. at 19.
28 MARY OWEN CAMERON, THE BOOSTER AND THE SNITCH: DEPARTMENT STORE
SHOPLIFTING 25 (1964).
Cameron’s study of shoplifting in 1940s Chicago
department stores found that black shoppers were “kept under much closer
observation than whites” and adolescents were “under almost constant
observation.” Id. at 31. Such scrutiny biases upwards estimates of black and
adolescent offending.
25
26
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commentator put the point, due to “self-fulfilling prophecies” about
criminality, “the shoplifting statistics ‘created’ by security personnel
may not accurately reflect shoplifting reality.”29
I deal with these difficulties in two ways. First, where possible, I
triangulate the facts by drawing upon multiple data types and sources.
Second, I indicate where sources conflict, and hedge my descriptions
accordingly.
1.

A Century of Petty Theft

Shoplifting first captured public attention shortly after the Civil
War, as department stores proliferated. 30 In this new retail setting,
shop owners could no longer monitor the entire premises, forcing them
to rely on clerks, who had relatively weaker incentives to prevent theft.
At the same time, customers were now allowed to browse unsupervised
and goods were moved to open display, making them easier to secret
away.31 Women were thought to do most of the pilfering.32 “[F]emale
fashion,” it was said, “afforded a lot of spacious hiding places for
articles,” giving female thieves a kind of technological advantage over
men. 33 Doubtless more important, department stores successfully
cultivated an almost exclusively female customer base.34
Women charged with shoplifting often “accused the stores of
permitting too much freedom; they became ‘over excited’ and over
stimulated in the large stores,” which afforded them the “‘deplorable
liberty’ to touch everything.”35 Some medical experts agreed—items on
KLEMKE, supra note __, at 120.
See, e.g., ELAINE S. ABELSON, WHEN LADIES GO A-THIEVING: MIDDLE-CLASS
SHOPLIFTERS IN THE VICTORIAN DEPARTMENT STORE 3 (1989); KERRY SEGRAVE,
SHOPLIFTING: A SOCIAL HISTORY 3 (2001).
31 See SEGRAVE, supra note __, at 17-18.
32 See Pilfering from Stores, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1883, at 5 (quoting store owner
who estimated, in 1883, that “[f]ully nineteen-twentieths” of shoplifters were
female). The best academic treatment is ABELSON, supra note __. Notorious
shoplifters of the era included ladies with colorful pseudonyms like “light-fingered
Sophie Lyons,” “Long Mary Moore,” “Frenchy Johnson,” “Black Lena” (who was
white), and “Kid Glove Rosie.” See SEGRAVE, supra note __, at 1-6.
33 SEGRAVE, supra note __, at 3 (“Women carried purses of various sizes, wore
outfits with long voluminous skirts, and were often decked out in shawls, gloves
and muffs.”); see also id. at 15 (“One woman had a hollow heel fashioned in her
shoes, another had puffs of hair lacquered to extra stiffness, to act as a receptacle
for small items.”).
34 In 1904, for example, Macy’s estimated that as many as ninety percent of its
patrons were women. Elaine S. Abelson, The Invention of Kleptomania, 15 SIGNS
123, 136 (1989).
35 Id. at 139 (quoting Paul Dubuisson, Les Voleuses des Grands Magasins, 16
ARCHIVES D’ANTHROPOLOGIE CRIMINELLE 1, 349 (1901)).
29
30
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open display, they argued, were temptations “better than Satan himself
could devise.”36 These women, moreover, were increasingly “well-to-do,
of good character.”37 Many retailers overlooked petty thefts by wealthy
women or allowed the offenders to pay their way out of trouble. 38
Kleptomania—a “distinctive, irresistible tendency to steal,” 39 thought
principally to afflict women—moved in and then out of fashion as a
defense.40 Yet all the way into the 1950s, the middle- or upper-class
woman remained the archetypal offender.41
During the 1950s and ‘60s, shoplifting gradually came to be seen as
an adolescent problem—initially still concentrated among females in
the middle and upper class. 42 “[T]he under-21 group,” wrote one
reporter, was then “on the greatest shoplifting spree in our history.”43

Patricia O’Brien, The Kleptomania Diagnosis: Bourgeois Women and Theft in
Late Nineteenth-Century France, 17 J. SOC. HIST. 65, 72 (1983); see also MICHAEL B.
MILLER, THE BON MARCHÉ: BOURGEOIS CULTURE AND THE DEPARTMENT STORE,
1869-1920, at 200-205 (1981) (describing nineteenth century medical opinion about
the irresistible and degrading effects of department stores on human—especially
female—morality).
37 SEGRAVE, supra note __, at 7; id. at 18-19; see also, e.g., War on Shoplifters,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1908, at 3 (“The professional shoplifters don’t bother us much
… nor is it the poor people who rob the stores, in most cases…. [W]ell-to-do
supposedly respectable women … are those who prey upon the stores.” (quoting
secretary of the Retail Dry Goods Association of N.Y.C.)).
38 See SEGRAVE, supra note __, at 7-8, 11.
39 O’Brien, supra note __, at 70 (quoting C.C.H. Marc, a French physician).
40 See SEGRAVE, supra note __, at 7-26. Individuals with kleptomania are now
understood to constitute a small proportion of shoplifters and a very small fraction
of the public. See, e.g., Brian L. Odlaug & Jon E. Grant, Impulse-Control Disorders
in a College Sample: Results from the Self-Administered Minnesota Impulse
Disorders Interview (MIDI), 12 PRIMARY CARE COMPANION J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY
(2010) (finding that, although 28.6% of college students surveyed reported having
stolen an item in their lifetime, only 0.4% met the DSM criteria for kleptomania).
41 See, e.g., SEGRAVE, supra note __, at 29-32; Alex J. Arieff & Carol G. Bowie,
Some Psychiatric Aspects of Shoplifting, 8 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 565
(1947); Cracking Down on Shoplifters, BUS. WK., Nov. 1, 1952, at 58, 61. Taking a
slightly different position, Cameron argues, based on her 1940s downtown Chicago
sample, that “well-to-do women shoplift in department stores considerably less
frequently than middle- and lower-class women.” CAMERON, supra note __, at 119.
42 See, e.g., CAMERON, supra note __, at 102; Gerald D. Robin, Patterns of
Department Store Shoplifting, 9 CRIME & DELINQ. 163 (1963). For popular
accounts, see Bill Davidson, They Steal Just for the Hell of It, SATURDAY EVENING
POST, May 18, 1968, at 24; Fredelle Maynard, The Housewives’ Crime, GOOD
HOUSEKEEPING, Oct. 1967, at 154. Sociologists had documented adolescent
involvement in shoplifting much earlier. See, e.g., CLIFFORD R. SHAW, THE
NATURAL HISTORY OF A DELINQUENT CAREER 57-58, 66-68 (1931).
43 Earl Selby, Youthful Shoplifting: A National Epidemic, READER’S DIG., Apr.
1967, at 95. A 1965 FBI report called shoplifting the nation’s fastest growing form
36
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Abbie Hoffman’s Steal This Book ushered the trend into the 1970s,44
when, for the first time, researchers also began to find that male
offenders were outpacing females.45 In the 1980s, the number of thefts
known to the police skyrocketed, though the causes are unclear.46
Early research on the racial and ethnic breakdown of shoplifters is
scarce. Many stores did not collect (or release) these data and the
premier shoplifting datasets excluded them.47 A handful of studies from
the 1970s and ‘80s found similar patterns of shoplifting activity across
racial groups of youth. 48 A single self-report study on adults found
higher levels of general theft behavior among non-whites than whites.49
2.

Contemporary Evidence

Shoplifting remains widespread today—recall that more than ten
percent of the population has shoplifted at least once, generating $50
million in losses each day. On the “who” question, the modern view
may consist of the unhelpful observation that “there is no ‘typical
shoplifter’”: “shoplifters come from varying social, age, and economic
groups.” 50 Nevertheless, the best data support a few tentative
generalizations. Two sources are especially useful: (1) sociologist Lloyd
Klemke’s review of the social science literature through 1992 and (2)
the National Epidemiological Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions
of larceny, up ninety-three percent over five years. John Edgar Hoover, Message
from the Director, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Dec. 1965, at 1.
44 ABBIE HOFFMAN, STEAL THIS BOOK (1971); see also MASS RETAILING INST.,
STORE THIEVES AND THEIR IMPACT 7 (1973) (reporting, based on survey of 1,188
stores, that a majority of shoplifters were under 18). Roughly one quarter to one
half of juveniles polled admitted to having pilfered. Compare Michael D. Geurts et
al., Researching Shoplifting and Other Deviant Customer Behavior, Using the
Randomized Response Research Design, 51 J. RETAILING 46 (1975); Changing
Morality: The Two Americas, TIME, June 6, 1969, with NAT’L COALITION TO
PREVENT SHOPLIFTING, SHOPLIFTING AND THE LAW 8 (1980), https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/Digitization/81811NCJRS.pdf; Amin el-Dirghami, Shoplifting Among
Students, 50 J. RETAILING 33, 33 (1973); Lloyd W. Klemke, Exploring Juvenile
Shoplifting, 67 SOC. & SOC. RES. 59, 61 (1982).
45 See, e.g., Klemke, supra note __, at 61 & tbl.1; Shoplifting Keeps Pace with
Inflation, SECURITY MGMT., July 1978, at 29 exh.1. For a review of numerous
additional studies from the 1970s and ‘80s, see KLEMKE, supra note __, at 47-50.
46 Because self-reported shoplifting statistics held steady in 1980s, Klemke
concludes that the increase shown in [known thefts] is more likely to be a product
of changes in apprehension and reporting practices than a real increase in
shoplifting behavior.” KLEMKE, supra note __, at 8.
47 See KLEMKE, supra note __, at 50-51.
48 See id. at 54 (reviewing studies); Saul Astor, Shoplifting: Far Greater Than
We Know?, SECURITY WORLD, Dec. 1969, at 12.
49 See CHARLES R. TITTLE, SANCTIONS AND SOCIAL DEVIANCE 87 tbl.4.3 (1980).
50 THOMAS BRAD BISHOP, THE LAW OF SHOPLIFTING 6 (2007).
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(NESARC), a large-scale, nationally representative survey from 20012002.
First, “there is a great deal of consensus that shoplifting is most
frequent in the early part of the life cycle and that it declines as
individuals move through the life cycle.”51 NESARC, for example, found
that two-thirds of shoplifting cases occur before age fifteen.52
Second, contemporary evidence “appears to overwhelmingly support
the conclusion that males are typically more active in shoplifting than
females.”53 NESARC found that nearly sixty percent of shoplifters were
male.54
Third, “racial and ethnic patterns of who shoplifts” seem to “vary
dramatically in different times and places.”55 “The limited research on
race and ethnic variations in shoplifting,” Klemke finds, “suggests that
only minor differences are evident in the population at large.” 56
NESARC shows something slightly different: “Native Americans had
higher odds [of shoplifting] than whites, although blacks, Hispanics,
and Asian Americans had lower odds of shoplifting than non-Hispanic
whites.” 57 Native-born Americans also reported shoplifting at higher
rates than those who are foreign born.58
Finally, the bulk of the evidence suggests that middle-class
individuals are most likely to shoplift. In NESARC, shoplifting “was
significantly more common in individuals with at least some college
education, among those with individual incomes over $35,000 and
family incomes over $70,000, and … less common among those with
public insurance.”59 Still, Klemke does find “slight to moderate inverse
relationships between social class and shoplifting behavior,” suggesting
the truly wealthy are infrequently involved.60
As for etiology, the evidence is mixed. Klemke, a sociologist, reads
the evidence to support sociological explanations, while the
psychiatrists interpreting NESARC emphasize psychiatric ones. “[I]t is
highly likely,” Klemke begins, “that some shoplifters fit the pathological
conception, others are best seen as societal victims, and many others fit
KLEMKE, supra note __, at 44 (summarizing research).
Blanco et al., supra note __, at 911.
53 KLEMKE, supra note __, at 50 (summarizing research).
54 Blanco et al., supra note __, at 906 tbl.1.
55 KLEMKE, supra note __, at 55.
56 Id. at 64.
57 Blanco et al., supra note __, at 909.
58 See id.
59 Id.; see also BISHOP, supra note __, at i (“There are very few people stealing,
as in Les Misérables, for a loaf of bread.”); CAMERON, supra note __, at 119
(reporting that apprehensions were not concentrated on individuals from the “slum
and ‘ghetto’ areas of Chicago”).
60 KLEMKE, supra note __, at 64.
51
52
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the frugal customer conception”—that is, their motivation “is the same
as for normal shopping: the acquisition of goods at minimum cost.”61
But in general, Klemke writes, recent studies “conclude that most
shoplifters are characterized by relatively normal psychological health
and personalities that are indistinguishable from non-shoplifters.” 62
They are not professionals “boosting” goods for resale.
Klemke
concludes that sociological theories stressing the individual’s
relationship to his environment can better explain who offends.63
The NESARC data, however, challenge the notion that shoplifters
resemble non-shoplifters along psychiatric dimensions. Researchers
found that “[t]he prevalence of all antisocial behaviors was higher
among individuals with a history of shoplifting than among those with
no self-reported history of shoplifting.” 64 And because many of the
behaviors associated with shoplifting can be “understood as a
manifestation of impulsivity,” the authors concluded, “our findings are
most consistent with the understanding of shoplifting as a behavioral
manifestation of impaired impulse control.”65
B. Private and Public Enforcement of Shoplifting Laws
As societal understandings of who shoplifts and why have evolved,
so have industry and state responses to the crime. In this Section, I
trace the path that led to the creation of a market for retail justice
companies. As I show, the enforcement model has long been shot
through with ambivalence and discretion. Recognizing this reality is
crucial when evaluating the changes that retail justice has wrought.

Id. at 78 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 86 (emphasis omitted).
63 On the structural (macro) level, there is some evidence consistent with strain
theory, which views deviance as animated by frustration with barriers to economic
success. See id. at 87-88, 93. On the individual (micro) level, both economic and
non-economic motivations (e.g., peer pressure, sporting) seem to play a role. See id.
at 88-93. And among juveniles, “shoplifting … is more frequently committed by
youth who are less strongly bound to the social order (family and school),” id. at 97,
and whose peers endorse the behavior, id. at 97-105.
64 Blanco et al., supra note __, at 909. In addition, almost ninety percent of
individuals with a history of shoplifting had received at least one psychiatric
diagnosis, compared to around fifty percent among non-shoplifters. Id. at 910.
65 Id. at 911; see also NAT’L COAL. TO PREVENT SHOPLIFTING, PROGRAM GUIDE
(1980), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/74730NCJRS.pdf (finding that,
of 25,000 students who had shoplifted, seventy percent claimed to have decided to
steal only once in the store).
61
62
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Ambivalence and Innovation

From the earliest public reports of shoplifting, retailers have been
fickle and ambivalent about formal law enforcement. Shoplifting hurts
the bottom line, but overly aggressive enforcement can too. Wrongful
arrests can trigger lawsuits, 66 and even legitimate ones might harm
business by scaring away customers who fear being wrongly accused.67
Many Progressive Era retailers, for these reasons, pressed charges only
selectively.68 They hired store detectives to help spot known shoplifters
and pooled information with other stores. 69 Although retailers
periodically resolved to toughen up, 70 they mostly released first-time
suspects after making a record.71 Wealthy women, in particular, were
often able to buy their way out of prosecution.72
By the 1950s, retailers could take advantage of new loss-prevention
technologies like closed-circuit cameras.73 States, too, began to enact
“merchant’s privilege” laws, shielding retailers from suit for false arrest
as long as probable cause supported a suspect’s apprehension.74 Within
ten years, every state had one.75 As crime rates then ballooned in the
1960s and ‘70s, states raised criminal penalties 76 and enacted “civil
recovery” statutes authorizing retailers to obtain super-restitutionary
damages. 77 Arrests rose, too, 78 despite lingering retailer ambivalence
about justice system involvement.79
66 As early as 1878, the New York Times reported on a $150 damages award to
a woman who’d been wrongly accused of stealing a purse. Editorial, N.Y. TIMES,
May 28, 1878, at 4.
67 See The Woman Who Pilfers, supra note __.
68 One defense lawyer estimated in 1906 that, of the 4,000 individuals arrested
for shoplifting in New York each year, only about 700 made it into court and only
50 were convicted. Shoplifting in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1906, at 15.
69 See SEGRAVE, supra note __, at 12.
70 See, e.g., War on Shoplifters, supra note __.
71 One major trade group in New York amassed a database of 55,000 known
shoplifters. See Maude Miner Hadden, Shoplifters of Many Types Mingle with the
Shoppers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1933, sec. 9, at 16.
72 See George C. Henderson, Caught with the Goods!, SUNSET MAG., Mar. 1927,
at 40.
73 See SEGRAVE, supra note __, at 46, 48.
74 See id. at 47.
75 Id. at 58.
76 See, e.g., NEV. ANTI-SHOPLIFTING COMM., WHAT TO DO ABOUT SHOPLIFTERS 5
(undated),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/40662NCJRS.pdf
(describing new statute authorizing up to ten years and $5,000 if property stolen is
worth more than $100).
77 See, e.g., 1976 Cal. Stat. 5047 (codified at Cal. Penal Code § 490.5).
78 The number of shoplifting arrests essentially tripled between 1970 and 1976.
Tis the Season To Be Wary, TIME, Dec. 12, 1977, at 22. And the number of retail
thefts known to the police more than doubled between 1973 and 1980. KLEMKE,
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By 1988, thirty states had passed civil recovery laws, many of which
allowed retailers to seek punitive damages.80 Retailers—or specialist
firms that serviced them—sent formal demand letters to suspected
offenders, followed, where necessary, by suit in small claims court.81
For some retailers, civil recovery replaced criminal prosecution, but
others sought both remedies simultaneously. 82 A 1998 survey found
that retailers employed civil recovery around thirty percent of the
time—roughly half the rate at which they sought criminal
prosecution.83
2.

The Persistence of Discretion

Retailers today remain reluctant to call the police, often opting
instead to exploit their property rights to sanction suspected thieves.84

supra note __, at 8; see also Rising Wave of Shoplifting—and No Solution in Sight,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 1970, at 56.
79 See, e.g., INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-GOV’T, PRIVATE SECURITY AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 97 (1974) (“In our survey involving [private police], fully 80% reported
there were certain types of criminal incidents which were not reported to the police.
These included … shoplifting …. According to the public police the most common
practice in this private system of justice is to … release suspected shoplifters or
maintain private listings of known criminals, especially shoplifters.”); Leonard E.
Daykin, Your Profit May Be in the Customer’s Pocket, PROGRESSIVE GROCER, Sept.
1968, at 60 (discussing survey of 2,000 grocers finding that 27.8% always
prosecuted, 34% occasionally prosecuted, 27% seldom prosecuted, and 17.2% never
prosecuted); see also Michael J. Hindelang, Decisions of Shoplifting Victims To
Invoke the Criminal Justice Process, 21 SOC. PROBS. 580, 583 tbl.1 (1974) (finding
an increasing rate of police referral during the 1960s).
80 See Delany J. Stinson, Attention Retailers: Civil Law Provides a Tonic,
SECURITY MGMT., Sept. 1988, at 129.
81 See id. at 131.
82 See RICHARD C. HOLLINGER ET AL., 1998 NATIONAL RETAIL SECURITY SURVEY:
FINAL REPORT 34 (1998); see also Audrey Aronsohn, Teaching Criminals the Cost of
Crime, SECURITY MGMT., May 1999, at 63, 64 (urging retailers to use both civil and
criminal remedies whenever possible).
83 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note __, at 34.
84 See, e.g., Joh, Conceptualizing, supra note __, at 590 (“The private police
department of Macy’s department store, in New York City, … reported to the public
police only fifty-six percent of the 1900 people accused of shoplifting that it
processed in a single year through its private detention center.”). Walmart has
banned some shoplifters from all 4,540 of its locations. See Al Norman, Banned
from
4,540
Walmarts,
HUFFPOST:
THE
BLOG
(June
26,
2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/al-norman/banned-from-4540walmarts_b_7147414.html. In some instances, retailers have allegedly exceeded
their property rights and levied nonrestitutionary fines, but this practice appears
to have been limited. See, e.g., Brae Canlen, Insecurity Complex, CAL. LAW., June
1998, at 81 (“[S]everal parents and guardians of teenagers who were picked up for
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But why? Theft, after all, is a classic, black-letter crime—a perfect fit,
one might think, for criminal-justice-system attention. And retailers
clearly regard shoplifting as a major problem.
I’ve already suggested a few possibilities, such as fear of suit for
false arrest or of alienating customers.85 Surely, though, these concerns
were diminished by strong merchants’ privilege protections and
improved surveillance capabilities that lower the risk of false
accusations; store security also have ways to minimize any visible
disturbance when apprehending suspects. 86 I explore this question
more deeply in Part II. It may be helpful, however, to give a preview
here, to outline the problem that retail justice companies claim to solve.
The starting point is to appreciate the enormity of the challenge
shoplifting presents. The sheer number of incidents in some major
retailers is staggering. In four Florida counties, for example, Walmart
stores—which, for some time, employed a “zero tolerance” policy—called
the police 7,000 times in one year on suspected thefts. 87 A single
Walmart store in Tulsa averages over 1,000 calls per year.88 A flow of
cases this large has two principal effects.
First, it strains criminal-justice-system resources. “It’s hard to
dedicate the manpower to process misdemeanor shoplifters,” explained
one police administrator. 89 A “typical theft costs the average police
department over $2,100 to process,” according to one account. 90
shoplifting” at Disneyland “claimed they were asked to pay a $275 to $500 fine to
avoid criminal prosecution.”).
85 See supra __; see also Alan D. Axelrod & Thomas Elkind, Note, Merchants’
Responses to Shoplifting: An Empirical Study, 28 STAN. L. REV. 589, 589-90 (1976)
(describing retailers’ stated reasons for caution, including “alienation of mistakenly
accused customers, the possibility of injury to employees, … the costs of
surveillance,” and “fears of civil suits for false arrest and false imprisonment”
(footnotes omitted)).
86 See Robin, supra note __, at 164.
87 Zachary T. Sampson et al., Walmart: Thousands of Police Calls. You Paid the
Bill, TAMPA BAY TIMES, May 11, 2016, http://www.tampabay.com/projects/2016/
public-safety/walmart-police. Walmart generated fourteen percent of the Camden,
South Carolina Police Department’s reports in one recent measure, most of which
were for shoplifting. Josh Sanburn, Low Prices, High Crime: Inside Walmart’s
Plan To Crack Down on Shoplifting, TIME, Aug. 15, 2016, http://time.com/4439650/
walmart-shoplifting-crime.
88 Shannon Pettypiece & David Voreacos, Walmart’s Out-of-Control Crime
Problem Is Driving Police Crazy, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 17, 2016),
http://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-walmart-crime.
89 EMILY GOLD & JULIUS LANG, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, DIVERTING
SHOPLIFTERS: A RESEARCH REPORT AND PLANNING GUIDE 5 (2012),
http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/e11117410_DivertingShoplifters-508.pdf; see also Pettypiece & Voreacos, supra note __ (“The constant
calls from Walmart are just draining ….” (quoting Florida police captain)).
90 GOLD & LANG, supra note __, at 4.
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Response times can be slow.91 Nor is the bottleneck in the police alone:
“There are courts in some of our markets,” explained the lossprevention director at one major discount retailer, “that tell us not to
bring them our casual shoplifters.”92 Whatever the reason, “[f]or the
criminal justice system players, low-level retail theft often occupies a
large percentage of misdemeanor caseloads, clogging the desks of
everyone involved.” 93 Not all shoplifting offenses are misdemeanors,
moreover—in some states, the felony threshold zooms by quickly.94
Second, calling the police in every case taxes retailers as well. “By
involving the public criminal justice system, the [retailer] loses control
over the process, and the costs—both in time and money—to cooperate
with the public police and courts can be significant.”95 Retailers are
reluctant to have their employees miss work to meet with the police or
testify in court, for example.96 All the more so because they receive no
direct benefit from the offender’s punishment.
3.

The Patterns of Discretion

In the absence of retail justice, the fate of many shoplifting suspects
is thus determined not by an exercise of police or prosecutorial
discretion, but rather by the retailer itself when deciding whether to
alert the public authorities. On what basis do retailers make these
important decisions?
Retailers have long employed “no-prosecution limits,” contacting the
police only when the goods stolen exceed some minimal value
threshold.97 Even Walmart, which, as noted, famously employed a “zero
tolerance” policy for many years, eventually adopted a dollar-value
cutoff—before contracting with CEC. 98 Strict cutoffs aside, research
finds that the value of the suspect’s take powerfully predicts whether
the case goes public. 99 The quality of the evidence matters too,
See Diane Ritchey, Walmart’s “Second Chance” Program for Shoplifters,
SECURITY, Nov. 1, 2016, http://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/87549walmarts-second-chance-program-for-shoplifters.
92 GOLD & LANG, supra note __, at 5.
93 Id. at 2.
94 See SHTEIR, supra note __, at 119.
95 Simmons, supra note __, at 925.
96 See GOLD & LANG, supra note __, at 4.
97 See, e.g., Comment, Shoplifting Law: Constitutional Ramifications of
Merchant Detention Statutes, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 295, 297 (1973).
98 See Michael Barbaro, Some Leeway for the Small Shoplifter, N.Y. TIMES, July
13, 2006, at C1.
99 See, e.g., Lawrence E. Cohen & Rodney Stark, Discriminatory Labeling and
the Five-Finger Discount, 11 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 25, 32 (1974); Melissa G.
Davis et al., Private Corporate Justice: Store Police, Shoplifters, and Civil Recovery,
91
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presumably because retailers are reluctant to incur the criminal justice
system’s costs where conviction is uncertain, 100 and because they
continue to fear liability for wrongful arrest.101
Researchers disagree on whether and how personal characteristics
of the suspect play a role. 102 All agree that women and men are
referred to the police at similar rates. 103 Some have found that
juveniles and senior citizens are treated leniently.104 The evidence on
race, however, is sharply conflicted.105
Class may influence retailer decisions as well. One of the most
recent academic studies found that poorer suspects are referred to the
police more frequently. 106 The motivation, however, may have been
neither animus toward the poor nor empathy for the affluent. The
study’s authors conclude, instead, that “[s]tore police skim the affluent
for civil recovery and ship the less affluent to the public criminal justice
system.”107 Retailers, in other words, may view civil recovery as the
first-best deterrent sanction, and resort to criminal justice, a secondbest, only where civil recovery will be ineffectual because the suspect is
insolvent. In this context, criminal law, just as economic analysis
prescribes, essentially functions as tort law for the indigent.108
38 SOC. PROBS. 395, 402 (1991); Hindelang, supra note __, at 583; Richard J.
Lundman, Shoplifting and Police Referral: A Reexamination, 69 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 395, 396 (1978).
100 See, e.g., Davis et al., supra note __, at 402.
101 See, e.g., CAMERON, supra note __, at 34; SEGRAVE, supra note __, at 37.
102 Disparate findings, of course, may reflect underlying variation among
retailers. See, e.g., Dean G. Rojek, Private Justice and Crime Reporting, 17
CRIMINOLOGY 100, 109 (1979) (“The frequency of arrests, along with the age and
sex of the alleged offenders were seen to fluctuate with almost wild abandon from
store to store.”).
103 See, e.g., Cohen & Stark, supra note __, at 35; Hindelang, supra note __, at
583 & tbl.1; Lundman, supra note __, at 397-98.
104 See, e.g., Lundman, supra note __, at 398. Others find no age effects. See,
e.g., Cohen & Stark, supra note __, at 36; Hindelang, supra note __, at 592; Rojek,
supra note __, at 109.
105 Compare CAMERON, supra note __; Robin, supra note __ (finding that black
shoppers were both disproportionately apprehended and disproportionately
referred to the police), with Cohen & Stark, supra note __, at 34; Hindelang, supra
note __, at 591-92 (finding no significant race effects on referral rates when
controlling for the value of the items stolen). Two additional papers that shared an
author, Richard Lundman, also conflicted—the first found a race effect while the
second did not. Compare Lundman, supra note __, at 397, 399, with Davis et al.,
supra note __, at 406.
106 See Davis et al., supra note __, at 406. But cf. Cohen & Stark, supra note __,
at 25.
107 Davis et al., supra note __, at 406.
108 See Alon Harel, Economic Analysis of Criminal Law: A Survey, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW 10, 16 (Alon Harel & Keith N.
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In fact, in a laboratory setting, with civil recovery out of the picture,
retail security investigators were more likely to refer clean, welldressed offenders for prosecution than dirty, poorly dressed ones.109 “In
accounting for this,” the study’s authors explain, “investigators
commented that they were more likely to be sympathetic towards a
shoplifter who appeared to need what he stole than towards a shoplifter
who appeared to be quite able to pay for the items involved.” 110
Similarly, customers in a different, controlled study reported welldressed shoplifters to store personnel twice as often as poorly dressed
ones.111
C. The Rise of Retail Justice
Where many observers saw a failing system of law enforcement—
overtaxed, cumbersome, ineffectual, possibly discriminatory, and overly
harsh toward those caught up in its net—entrepreneurs saw an
opportunity for profit and Pareto improvement. The basic idea can be
simply stated. Retail justice companies offer private settlement of
criminal complaints. The crime victim assigns its complaint to the
retail justice company, which extracts payment from the alleged
offender in exchange for rehabilitative education and a promise not to
contact the police. The payment—and possibly the “restorative justice”
course—reduce the likelihood that the suspect will offend in the future,
providing the same (type of) benefit to the victim that public law
enforcement would. The payment and education are nonetheless
preferable, from the suspect’s perspective, to contact with the criminal
justice system. Neither the victim nor the public authorities spend
anything. One leading company touts that the “program enables firsttime offenders to correct their mistakes and avoid prosecution.
Retailers can reallocate loss prevention resources and law enforcement

Hylton eds., 2012) (noting that economic analysis leads to the conclusion that
“monetary sanctions … ought to be used in cases where the wrongdoer is wealthy,
while imprisonment ought to be used only where monetary sanctions cannot be
used due to insolvency of the wrongdoer”).
109 See Andrey Feuerverger & Clifford D. Shearing, An Analysis of the
Prosecution of Shoplifters, 20 CRIMINOLOGY 273, 285 (1982).
110 Id.
111 See Fred Fedler & Bert Pryor, An Equity Theory Explanation of Bystanders’
Reactions to Shoplifting, 54 PSYCH. REPORTS 746 (1984). As for what happens after
the police become involved, see Kenneth Adams & Charles R. Cutshall, Refusing To
Prosecute Minor Offenses: The Relative Influence of Legal and Extralegal Factors, 4
JUST. Q. 595, 604-05 (1987) (finding that race and gender significantly predict
prosecutorial decisions to dismiss charges, though prior arrests and number of
charged offenses are stronger predictors).
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can focus their efforts in more effective ways for their individual
communities.”112
Here’s how the process works at what appears to be the leading
outfit, CEC. CEC is a Utah-based corporation with a national presence,
founded by a pair of Harvard Business School graduates in 2010. 113
CEC has venture-capital backing and reports $500,000 to $1,000,000 in
annual sales with no substantial debt. 114 CEC also boasts an
impressive client list, which reportedly has included Walmart,
Bloomingdales, DSW, Abercrombie & Fitch, Burlington Coat Factory,
Whole Foods, American Apparel, Goodwill Industries, Sport Chalet,
Kroger’s, Sportsman’s Warehouse, and H&M.115
Store security guards—not CEC personnel—retain responsibility for
monitoring the retail premises and apprehending suspected
shoplifters. 116 When a guard makes an apprehension, he brings the
suspect to a private room and runs a check for criminal history,
outstanding warrants, and prior apprehension.117 Most suspects who
are deemed “sufficiently low-risk” are given two options: resist, in which
case the guard will call the police, or agree to pay $400 to $500 to enroll
in CEC’s “restorative justice” course—and walk out the front door. CEC
offers payment plans for those who cannot finance the entire fee at once
and “scholarships” for the poorest few. 118 For years, suspects who
enrolled also signed a “Criminal Compromise Agreement” and admitted

Our Story – Origin of CEC, CEC (Oct. 25, 2016, 5:49AM),
https://www.correctiveeducation.com/home/blog/our-story-origin-of-cec.
113 Leon Neyfakh, Let’s Make a Deal, SLATE (Feb. 16, 2015, 4:25PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2015/02/
shoplifting_at_whole_foods_or_bloomingdale_s_pay_corrective_education_company.
html.
114 See Corrective Education Company Receives Funding from Decathlon
Partners, CEC (Feb. 24, 2015, 7:48PM), https://www.correctiveeducation.com/home/
blog/corrective-education-company-receives-funding-from-decathlon-partners;
Corrective Education Co, LLC, EXPERIAN COMMERCIAL RISK DATABASE,
http://www.experian.com/business-information/commercial-risk-database-plus.html
(last visited May 11, 2017).
115 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note __, at *13; see also Neyfakh, supra
note __.
116 See Neyfakh, supra note __.
117 See CEC, supra note __ (“CEC Connect™ qualifies offenders through a
database of 50 billion records and meets the most rigorous security and privacy
standards.”).
118 See Neyfakh, supra note __ (“The company accepts credit cards, e-checks,
and money orders, and while they offer a ‘scholarship’ program for people below the
poverty line, . . . about 85 percent of offenders pay the full fee, and less than 2
percent qualify for a free ride.”).
112
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guilt; 119 today, the contract is styled as a “Restorative Justice
Agreement” and no confession is required.120
Around ninety percent of the 20,000 individuals presented with the
choice during CEC’s first four years opted to enroll. An enrollee’s first
actual contact with CEC is typically a call from a “life coach” who
reaches out to “tell them about the course and make a payment plan.”121
The core of CEC’s course, which most “students” take online over six to
eight hours, was developed by a clinical psychologist and adapted by
CEC “for the purpose of rehabilitating shoplifters.” 122 It “focuses on
helping accused shoplifters develop life skills, so that they are less
likely to reoffend in the future.”123 On CEC’s own account:
There’s a chapter that helps them understand what could have
happened if they’d gone through the traditional process. But
after that, we give them skills and the ability to actually go out
and get a job …. These people that are getting apprehended
typically haven’t been taught the life principles of how to build a
resume, how to be presentable in an interview. They haven’t
been given the skills to understand what a budget is, never mind
how to manage their money. So as they’re going through the
course, they build their own resume, they build their own
budget, a work-out plan, an eating plan.124
The retailer, for its part, saves time processing suspects, says CEC.
“Studies have proven a 40% reduction in processing time when using
CEC’s platform,” the company claims. 125 Until recently, the retailer
also collected a cut of CEC’s fee, around $40, each time it presented a
suspect who enrolled. 126 CEC charges the retailer nothing for its
services, which it touts as being “completely offender funded.”127 “Law
See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note __, at *18. “[W]hen offenders are
apprehended, they are shown a brief video about CEC before they’re sent home,
which tells them that if they believe that are innocent, they should obtain legal
counsel and fight whatever charges may come.” Neyfakh, supra note __.
120 Telephone Interview with Brian Ashton, CEO, CEC (Dec. 4, 2017).
121 Neyfakh, supra note __.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 CEC, supra note __.
126 Neyfakh, supra note __.
CEO Brian Ashton informed me that CEC has
ended this practice. Telephone Interview with Brian Ashton, supra note __.
127 Neyfakh, supra note __. CEC’s business model may have changed slightly
since Neyfakh wrote. See CEC, supra note __ (“CEC’s program is offender funded.
The technology, database and professional services are all provided at little or no
cost to the retailer.”).
119
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enforcement agencies have also noticed our impact,” CEC maintains,
“seeing as much as a 40 percent drop in the number of calls for service
in their communities.”128 Journalists have found even larger effects.129
CEC proudly advertises success in battling recidivism, claiming that
it “reduces the likelihood that a shoplifter will come back to the store to
steal again.” 130 “Less than 2% of shoplifters who complete the CEC
educational program reoffend” at one of CEC’s retailers, “compared
with estimates as high as 80% for those who do not participate in a
restorative justice program.”131 “CEC’s educational programs not only
addresses [sic] behavioral issues, but provide life skills and motivation
for reintegration,” the company’s website explains. 132
CEC is
“continually reforming generations and changing lives, one day at a
time,” it adds.133 Indeed, CEC even offers testimonials from “graduates”
who claim the program helped them “create new values, attitudes, and
goals” and “achieve self-responsibility and self-worth.”134
Contracting with CEC commits retailers to sorting cases according
to predetermined characteristics, without any on-the-scene discretion.
In addition to the criminal-history screen, CEC permits retailers to set
eligibility criteria including age and item value, but excluding race,
gender, nationality, language ability, or related characteristics. 135
Suspects who are too young or too old,136 and those whose thefts are too
128 Our Story – Origin of CEC, supra note __; Cheryel Carpenter, Restorative
Justice Initiative Results in Three International Awards, ARLINGTON POLICE
DEPARTMENT (Oct. 25, 2017), http://www.arlington-tx.gov/police/2017/10/25/
restorative-justice-initiative-results-three-international-awards
(describing
a
Walmart Restorative Justice Initiative with CEC resulting in “more than a 50
percent reduction in theft calls for service and overall arrests”); Natalie Crofts, 1st
Time Shoplifters Can Keep Clean Record with Help of Utah Company, KSL.COM
(Sept. 20, 2014, 4:25PM), https://www.ksl.com/index.php?nid=148&sid=31774717
(quoting supportive commentary from Salt Lake City Police Department property
crime detective).
129 See, e.g., Deborah Knapp, Walmart Cracks Down on Shoplifting by Taking
Justice into Its Own Hands, KENS5 (San Antonio) (Nov. 12, 2016, 11:31AM),
http://www.kens5.com/features/walmart-cracks-down-on-shoplifting-by-takingjustice-into-its-own-hands/351317792 (reporting, based on review of police records,
drops of 33, 49, 56, and 72% at four Texas Walmart stores).
130 Neyfakh, supra note __.
131 Statement of Corrective Education Company, CEC (June 8, 2016, 3:40AM),
https://www.correctiveeducation.com/home/blog/statement-of-corrective-educationcompany; Telephone Interview with Brian Ashton, supra note __.
132 CEC, supra note __.
133 Id.
134 Id. (testimony of Eleanor).
135 Telephone Interview with Brian Ashton, supra note __.
136 CEC uses a different “restorative justice” course for juveniles whom the
retailer’s criteria do not exclude. See Corrective Education Company Announces
Exclusive Partnership with D.A.R.E. at National Retail Federation Convention,
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small, may be released, while suspects who steal high-value items may
be referred to the police. Retailers set these criteria at the corporate
level embedded in a “black box”—the security guard simply enters the
suspect’s demographic information and the item value into a computer
application and is instructed how to proceed.137
There is less public information about CEC’s competitors, like
Turning Point Justice (TPJ), though enough to discern that the basic
model seems similar.138 TPJ was founded in 2012 by a former district
attorney from Salt Lake County, Utah. 139 In an apparent effort to
distinguish itself from CEC, TPJ touts a “restorative justice” program
developed by the National Association of Shoplifting Prevention and
used by courts—as part of post-arrest diversion programs—for over 20
years.140
II. EVALUATING RETAIL JUSTICE
This Part pivots from description to evaluation. Sections A through
C examine whether retail justice seems likely to harm suspects, victims,
or the broader public, respectively. Throughout, I compare retail justice
to the actual criminal justice system, warts and all. Section D then
explains why justifications for prohibiting blackmail do not support a
ban on retail justice.
A. Are Suspects Worse Off?
Retail justice companies, critics argue, prey on vulnerable
consumers, wielding the threat of criminal prosecution to extract
confessions and hefty enrollment fees. The profit motive, moreover,
CEC (June 29, 2015, 11:27AM), https://www.correctiveeducation.com/home/blog/
corrective-education-company-announces-exclusive-partnership-with-dare-atnational-retail-federation-convention.
137 Id.
138 See TURNING POINT JUSTICE, http://turningpointjustice.com/Home (last
visited July 25, 2017).
139 Leadership Team, TURNING POINT JUSTICE, supra note __.
140 TURNING POINT JUSTICE, supra note __. One other noticeable difference is
that TPJ calculates restitution in each individual case, “which covers the cost of the
item, any damages to the retailer’s loss prevention technologies, as well as the
retailer’s time spent apprehending and processing the shoplifter.” Retailers,
TURNING POINT JUSTICE, supra; see also id. (describing TPJ tool’s integration with
existing civil demand services). TPJ may also screen cases differently, contacting
the police not only for repeat offenders but also when “[t]he crime is committed for
the purpose of resale or Organized Retail Crime,” “[t]he offender is physically
aggressive or non-compliant,” or “[t]he offender appears to be mentally incompetent
or under the influence of drugs or alcohol.” Justice System, TURNING POINT
JUSTICE, supra note __.
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creates incentives for overzealous enforcement, the brunt of which
disfavored groups or, worse yet, the innocent will bear.141 Indeed, the
City of San Francisco asserted the interests of its residents when it
sued CEC in 2015, seeking to halt its operation.142 And the trial court
recently accepted the City’s argument.143 But are shoplifting suspects
really better off without the retail justice alternative?
This Section begins to think through this question in three stages:
First, is retail justice a “bad deal” for suspects in an economic sense,
such that we should reject the standard assumption that, because
suspects choose it, it makes them better off? Second, even if retail
justice makes suspects better off in general, does it disadvantage
particular groups of suspects, such as the poor or people of color? Third,
does the retail justice model encourage overenforcement of shoplifting
laws, potentially even ensnaring suspects who are legally or
normatively innocent?
1.

Economic Efficiency: Is Retail Justice a “Bad Deal” for Suspects?

The “standard Pareto argument,” applied here, is that retail justice
“improves the situation” of the suspects who choose it. 144 The
agreement suspects sign to enroll with CEC, for instance, is an offer to
contract, which suspects are (at least formally) free to reject. Sure
enough, in marketing their services, retail justice companies emphasize
how they help offenders by sheltering them from the criminal justice
system and extending to them the proverbial “second chance.”145
The standard Pareto argument fails, however, where the conditions
for efficient contracting are lacking.146 I consider four possibilities. The
first three correspond, sometimes loosely, to contract law’s concepts of
See, e.g., Neyfakh, supra note __ (reporting that all four public defenders
interviewed were “pretty appalled” by CEC’s business model, commenting that
“[t]here’s no judicial oversight, there are no constitutional protections, there’s no
due process,” and that “it sounded like CEC was ‘flirting with the crime of coercion
in the second degree’”); see also Laird, supra note __ (reporting that “some
observers are skeptical,” worrying that “the programs … could ensnare innocent
people without due process”).
142 See Complaint, supra note __.
143 People ex rel. Herrera v. Corrective Education Co., No. CGC-15-549094, slip
op. at 3 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug. 14, 2017) (order granting summary judgment in part).
144 Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Prisoners’ (Plea Bargain) Dilemma,
1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 737, 738 (2009).
145 See, e.g., CEC, supra note __; Justice System, TURNING POINT JUSTICE, supra
note __.
146 Cf. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101
YALE L.J. 1909, 1940-49 (1992) (identifying circumstances in which “the
assumption of efficient contracting” fails in the plea bargaining context).
141
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undue influence, misrepresentation, and mistake of fact. The last
entertains the notion that, even if retail justice benefits suspects
individually, it harms them as a class by exploiting a collective action
problem among them.
(a) Undue influence. — “Free consent is … a predicate condition of
presuming mutually valuable exchange.” 147 To many, this is the
principal problem with retail justice: suspects pay the retail justice
companies’ fees only under serious pressure from the threat of arrest
and criminal prosecution. As a factual matter, the critique hits its
mark—these suspects face an unenviable dilemma. But it does not
follow that they are worse off for having to make the choice, or that
retail justice companies should be prohibited from offering it to them.
“Even highly coercive threats are present in many types of
legitimate economic bargaining.”148 Duress, of course, is unlawful, but
duress occurs only where the “offeror” “manufactures a false choice for
the offeree”: “your money or your life.”149 Yet retailers are perfectly free
to call the police on suspected shoplifters; the choice is not “false” in the
relevant sense. At bottom, the pressure on suspects originates not with
the retailers or retail justice companies but rather the erratic and
draconian criminal justice system suspects are desperate to avoid.150
The law also prohibits “undue influence,” where circumstances
suggest that the pressured party’s assent “does not reflect his
preference” or is “contrary to self-interest.” 151 I am skeptical this
describes the retail justice landscape, though it may for particular
pockets of the suspect population. Consider the dilemma from the
perspective of a typical guilty suspect, who must weigh the cost of
enrolling with a retail justice company and completing the required
course, on the one hand, against the expected consequences of contact
with the criminal justice system, on the other. The latter include the
physical danger 152 and collateral consequences of arrest 153 and
ALAN DEVLIN, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 186 (2015).
James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
670, 701 & n.162 (1984); see also Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Blackmail as Private
Justice, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1935, 1950 n.32 (1993).
149 DEVLIN, supra note __, at 187.
150 The question of false choice reappears infra Section II.A(1)(d) in the
discussion of suspects’ collective action problem. Some additional objections are
dealt with there.
151 DEVLIN, supra note __, at 186.
152 See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ARRESTRELATED DEATHS 2003-2009, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ard0309st.pdf
(estimating 700 arrest-related deaths annually); Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Death in
Custody:
Arrest-Related,
https://openjustice.doj.ca.gov/death-in-custody/arrestrelated (last visited Aug. 12, 2017) (reporting that twenty percent of all deaths in
custody are arrest-related). Sandra Bland’s death is, for many, most salient. See
147
148
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preventive detention154 (even if he’s never prosecuted); a dizzying array
of costs and fees (even if he’s indigent); 155 and the possibility of
punishment,156 with its attendant collateral consequences.157
Leon Neyfakh, Why Was Sandra Bland Still in Jail?, SLATE (July 23, 2015,
8:17PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2015/07/
sandra_bland_is_the_bail_system_that_kept_her_in_prison_unconstitutional.html.
Disease is also a concern. See, e.g., Joseph A. Bick, Infection Control in Jails and
Prisons, 45 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1047, 1047 (2007) (describing the
“increased risk” of disease acquisition in carceral institutions).
153 See, e.g., Jeff Grogger, Arrests, Persistent Youth Joblessness, and
Black/White Employment Differentials, 74 REV. ECON. & STATS. 100 (1992) (finding
that arrests help explain persistent non-employment and the black/white
employment gap); Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307, 313-15
(2016) (“Arrestees lose income during the arrest, and sometimes their jobs when
they do not show up for work. They pay arrest fees, booking fees, and perhaps
attorney’s fees …. An arrest can affect child custody rights, it can trigger
deportation, and it can get a suspect kicked out of public housing. Over the long
term, individuals with arrest records may have worse employment and financial
prospects. And all of these consequences can occur even if the arrestee is never
convicted of a crime.” (footnotes omitted)); Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67
STAN. L. REV. 809, 810 (2015) (describing how “immigration enforcement officials,
public housing authorities, public benefits administrators, employers, licensing
authorities, social services providers, and education officials, among others” use
arrest information adversely against arrestees).
154 See, e.g., Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Death in Custody: Booking & Pre-Trial,
https://openjustice.doj.ca.gov/death-in-custody/pretrial (last visited Aug. 12, 2017)
(reporting that fifteen percent of all deaths in custody occurred among detainees
awaiting arraignment or trial); Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug.
13, 2015, at MM38 (describing a defendant who “lost three weeks of income, was
subjected to brutal physical violence and missed Thanksgiving dinner with his
family” before his charges were dismissed for lack of evidence). Pretrial detention
can be lengthy even on minor charges. See, e.g., Steven B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh,
Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J.
2150, 2162 (2013) (“A woman in Mississippi charged with shoplifting spent eleven
months in jail before a lawyer was appointed to her case, and three additional
months before entering a guilty plea.”).
155 For comprehensive taxonomies, see Laura I. Appleman, Nickel and Dimed
into Incarceration: Cash-Register Justice in the Criminal System, 57 B.C. L. REV.
1483, 1485 (2016) (describing “[p]rivate probation, bail fees, translation fees,
indigent representation fees, dismissal fees, high interest rates, jail and prison
costs, court fines, and community service charges”); Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F.
Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175, 1185-96; see also
Konig, supra note __ (reporting court and legal fees for shoplifting cases in the
hundreds or thousands of dollars).
156 See, e.g., Ryan P. Sullivan et al., Stolen Profits: Civil Shoplifting Demands
and the Misuse of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21.194, 95 NEB. L. REV. 28, 32 (2016)
(reporting that, in Florida, shoplifting a $10 item could result in 60 days in jail and
$500 in fines and fees; in Nebraska, 6 months and $1000). For thefts of costlier
items, substantially larger penalties may obtain. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 18.2-103
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It would be perfectly rational for a self-interested suspect to prefer
the retail justice option. All the more so if he’s risk averse and thus
benefits from the certainty retail justice provides. In fact, it would be
perfectly rational, though tragic, for an innocent suspect as well. While
the probability of prosecution and conviction are presumably lower for
an innocent suspect, they’re not negligible,158 and the consequences of
arrest are just the same as for the guilty. Indeed, we’ve understood
since Malcolm Feeley’s famous tome that, for many accused
misdemeanants, “the process is the punishment.”159
The criminal justice system’s severity, it is crucial to see, is the
fertile soil that nourishes the retail justice industry. Public choice
theory predicts as much. As Keith Hylton has explained in a related
context, “[a] system of harsh punishments encourages rent-seeking (for
example, bribe-taking) on the part of law enforcement officials.”160 “As
the harshness of penalties increases,” Hylton continues, “law
enforcement agents have greater leverage with which to seek bribes,
which can be demanded of the guilty and innocent alike.”161 Hylton is
writing about public law enforcement agents, but private agents—with
the power to stave off the public ones—can extract these rents as well.
(b) Misrepresentation. — Retail justice companies boast about the
transformational power of their “restorative justice” programs—which,
they say, drive down recidivism—even posting testimonials from

(defining theft of $200 or more as grand larceny); id. § 18.2-95 (authorizing grand
larceny sentence of up to twenty years).
157 See, e.g., John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The Evolving Right to
Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 23-34 (2013) (cataloging consequences of
misdemeanor convictions, including loss of the right to possess a firearm, serve in
the military, receive public benefits, drive a car legally, and adopt a child); Jenny
Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in Lower Courts,
45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 298-99 (2011) (explaining that misdemeanor convictions
can trigger deportation, loss of student-loan assistance, and eviction from public
housing); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48 n.11 (1972) (Powell, J.,
concurring in the result) (listing social stigma, forfeiture of public office,
disqualification from a licensed profession, and loss of pension rights).
158 On the risks of wrongful conviction for misdemeanor defendants, see
Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1328-50 (2012)
(describing the criminal justice system’s “high tolerance for wrongful petty
convictions”).
159 See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING
CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979); see also Bowers, supra note __, at 113239.
160 Keith N. Hylton, Whom Should We Punish, and How? Rational Incentives
and Criminal Justice Reform 8 (B.U. Sch. of Law Law & Econ. Paper No. 17-18,
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2982371.
161 Id. at 9.
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“students” describing their reformations.162 These claims strike my ear
as naïve, if not disingenuous. The pertinent “student” population,
recall, has been cleansed of repeat offenders. Multiple studies have
found that shoplifters seldom reoffend after they’re first
apprehended,163 meaning the baseline rate of recidivism is likely low.
Of those who do steal again, most will escape detection.164 Estimates of
recidivism based on subsequent apprehension will therefore understate
the true rate, potentially severely.165 To draw the points together: it’s
not a big accomplishment to get first-time shoplifters to desist and, in
any event, likely more of them are recidivating than the studies detect.
To be sure, some CEC “students” are probably more serious
criminals who’ve somehow managed to keep their records clean. But
the evidence suggests that rehabilitating this population is an
enormous challenge.166 An eight-hour online course is no brace against
the deep-seated personal and structural forces that precipitate serious
criminality.167 Nor, for what it’s worth, does CEC’s course appear to
incorporate even the most basic elements of the “restorative justice”
See, e.g., CEC, supra note __.
See, e.g., CAMERON, supra note __, at 150 (“Among pilferers who are
apprehended and interrogated by the store police but set free without formal
charge, there is very little or no recidivism.”); Cohen & Stark, supra note __, at 30
(“[V]irtually no one continues shoplifting after being apprehended once ….”
(emphasis omitted)); Admit Your Guilt, Serve No Time, PROGRESSIVE GROCER, Nov.
1991, at 8 (finding that only five percent of individuals who were apprehended for
shoplifting and paid civil damages were later reapprehended). Klemke argues that
“there are serious under-reporting biases in these studies.” KLEMKE, supra note __,
at 125; see Klemke, supra note __, at 396 & tbl.1 (finding, using a self-report
methodology, that forty percent of youths shoplifted again after having been
apprehended). Of course, the same under-reporting biases likely infect the retail
justice companies’ recidivism figures as well.
164 See Shoplifting Statistics, supra note __ (estimating that 1/48 shoplifters is
apprehended).
165 A fortiori if recidivism figures are based on subsequent arrest by the public
police, as at least one CEC study appears to have been. See Neyfakh, supra note __
(“When the company presented a law enforcement agency in Florida with a list of
several hundred people in their jurisdiction who had completed the CEC course
during the previous two years, they were told that less than 1 percent of the
sample had since been arrested for any crime ….”).
166 See, e.g., Bruce Western, The Rehabilitation Paradox, THE NEW YORKER,
May 9, 2016, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-rehabilitationparadox.
167 See, e.g., Lance Lochner & Enrico Moretti, The Effect of Education on Crime:
Evidence from Prison Inmates, Arrests, and Self-Reports, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 155
(2004); Steven Raphael & Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Identifying the Effect of
Unemployment on Crime, 44 J.L. & ECON. 259 (2001); John Paul Wright et al.,
Association of Prenatal and Childhood Blood Lead Concentrations with Criminal
Arrests in Early Adulthood, 5 PLOS MED. 732 (2008).
162
163
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movement in whose flag it is wrapped.168 All this raises the possibility
that retail justice companies misrepresent the benefits they deliver in
exchange for the fees they collect. If any such misrepresentation is
inducing suspects to enroll, the Pareto assumption (that enrollment
benefits suspects) may be misplaced.169
It seems to me doubtful, however, that this is the case. More likely,
the retail justice companies’ claims about recidivism are immaterial to
suspects’ decisions to enroll. Reliance is likely lacking. Indeed, in
attacking CEC’s business model, San Francisco alleges that people pay
CEC’s fees for no other reason than to avoid contact with the criminal
justice system. 170
That hardly suggests suspects are being
hoodwinked—quite the contrary. If suspects don’t expect anything of
value from the course—and would pay the fees even if no course were
offered, for instance—then the retail justice companies defraud them of
nothing if the course turns out to be worthless.
(c) Mistake. — A third potential “market failure” that could
undermine the efficient-contracting assumption relates to asymmetric
information. Maybe suspects choose retail justice, the argument goes,
because they harbor misconceptions—which the retail justice
companies exploit, if not foster—about their expected sanctions in the
criminal justice system, particularly as first-time offenders.171 Worse
yet, some critics argue, retail justice companies afford none of the
procedural rights criminal defendants enjoy—in particular, no judicial
oversight and no assistance from counsel who might help them assess

168 One expert commented, for example, that retail justice “does not sound like
a model for restorative justice.” Laird, supra note __ (quoting Professor Mary
Louise Frampton); see, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE &
RESPONSIVE REGULATION 11 (2002) (defining restorative justice as “a process
whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular offence come together to resolve
collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications for
the future,” where the stakeholders are the victim, offender, and affected
community, who deliberate about “what restoration means in a specific context”);
Stephen P. Garvey, Restorative Justice, Punishment, and Atonement, 2003 UTAH L.
REV. 303, 303 (listing “victim-offender mediation, family group conference, and
sentencing circles” as “the processes associated with restorative justice”). Although
“restorative justice theory uniformly endorses[] restitution as the primary remedial
response to criminal acts[,] [t]he specific amount and form of this restitution is
usually agreed upon by both the victim and the offender through some form of
mediation process.” Garvey, supra, at 307.
169 See DEVLIN, supra note __, at 188.
170 See Complaint, supra note __, at 10.
171 A court may be reluctant to allocate the risk of mistake to the suspect given
the circumstances in which his agreement is sought, cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 154 (AM. LAW INST. 1981), creating the possibility that the resulting
contract is voidable by the suspect, cf. id. § 153.
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their odds before paying to enroll. 172 If suspects understood the
prosecutor was unlikely to pursue charges, for instance, they’d have
little reason to pay the fee. Indeed, San Francisco’s legal theory hinges
partly on the purported leniency of its criminal justice system, which, it
says, belies the threatening messages CEC delivers to shoplifting
suspects. 173 (CEC appears to have tempered its messaging since the
lawsuit was filed, now saying less about what suspects can expect if
they decline to enroll.174)
This line of argument suggests an important limit on the
circumstances in which retail justice can be assumed beneficial based
on suspect choice. The more retail justice companies exploit the
misapprehensions of their “students” about the criminal justice system,
the better the case for regulating their activity. The risk may be
highest where local justice is most lenient, suggesting, among other
things, that retail justice companies should tailor their messaging to
local legal context.
The point should not be overstated, however. Even factoring in the
possibility of diversion, non-prosecution, and other exercises of mercy,
the criminal justice system in most jurisdictions is something to be
feared and avoided at virtually any cost. An arrest alone can be
devastating, even in San Francisco.175 As for procedural protections, we
ought not glamorize this aspect of the criminal process either. Most
misdemeanor prosecutions, argues Alexandra Natapoff in her searing
exposé, “baldly contradict the standard due process model of criminal
adjudication,” lacking “the evidentiary and procedural protections that
are supposed to ensure the guilt of the accused.” 176 Perhaps most
shockingly, there is “compelling evidence that … petty offenders in
particular[] often do not get counsel even when they are legally entitled

See, e.g., Neyfakh, supra note __; cf. Brown, supra note __, at 1972.
See Complaint, supra note __, at 1. Note that risk-averse suspects may
prefer retail justice even where its expected sanctions are slightly higher, if
criminal-justice-system contact brings more uncertainty.
174 See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note __, at *16-*17.
175 On the consequences of arrest generally, see supra notes __. Regarding San
Francisco specifically, a pending class action lawsuit alleges that the City’s
implementation of its bail schedule effects an unconstitutional wealth-based
detention scheme. One of the lead plaintiffs, Riana Buffin, was allegedly arrested
for theft from a department store and, unable to pay her $30,000 bail, held for
forty-six hours before the prosecutor decided not to file charges, causing her to lose
her job at the Oakland airport. See Third Amended Class Action Complaint at 6-7,
Buffin v. City of S.F., No. 15-CV-4959 (YGR) (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2016), 2016 WL
3587128.
176 Natapoff, supra note __, at 1315, 1316.
172
173
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to it.”177 Those who do get an attorney may receive only a few minutes
of consultation before entering a plea.178 Judicial oversight is scarce.179
Yet the collateral consequences of conviction attach just the same.180 I
could be wrong, but my suspicion is that more people underestimate
than overestimate the criminal justice system’s horrors.181
(d) Collective action / externalities. — Finally, it may be that, while
any particular suspect, viewed in isolation, benefits from an expanded
choice set, the class of suspects as a whole is actually harmed. That is,
retail justice companies may appear to help suspected shoplifters only
by exploiting a collective action problem that prevents them from
banding together in resistance. Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar
have modeled the point in the plea bargaining context. 182 The basic
intuition is that, if all defendants could agree to insist on trial, they
would overwhelm the criminal justice system and prosecutors would be
forced to forego prosecution in many cases. 183 As Bar-Gill and BenShahar note, “[p]lea bargains are contracts with externalities: each
defendant who accepts a plea frees prosecutorial resources to pursue
other defendants.”184

177 Id. at 1341 (emphasis added); see id. at 1340-42. The constitutional rule,
evidently honored in the breach, mandates counsel whenever incarceration is
imposed. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
178 See, e.g., Natapoff, supra note __ (describing misdemeanor representation as
often “a formality,” id. at 1342, “better described as facilitating the guilty plea
rather than checking the merits of the case,” id. at 1343); Lisa C. Wood et al., Meetand-Plead: The Inevitable Consequence of Crushing Defender Workloads, LITIG.,
Winter 2016, at 20 (asserting that “attorneys engage in meet-and-plead
dispositions in courtrooms across the country”).
179 See, e.g., Shima Baradaran Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1071, 1138 (2017) (lamenting “wrongful and pressured convictions by
plea agreements without any judicial oversight”); Kate Levine, How We Prosecute
the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 745, 747-48 (2016) (“Reams of scholarship look at the lack
of judicial oversight at every stage of the process, from plea bargains to sentencing
decisions, and waivers that make pleas virtually unreviewable by appellate
courts.”); see also United States v. Baldwin, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (reserving jury
trial right to crimes punishable by more than six months imprisonment).
180 Cf. Paul T. Crane, Charging on the Margin, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 775
(2016) (arguing that courts should consider collateral consequences in determining
which procedural protections to afford a defendant).
181 Cf., e.g., Kirk R. Williams et al., Public Knowledge of Statutory Penalties:
The Extent and Basis of Accurate Perception, 23 PAC. SOC. REV. 105 (1980)
(concluding that the general public underestimates the severity of sanctions).
Perceptions may vary by social class, depending upon the extent of peer contact
with the system.
182 Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note __.
183 See id. at 739.
184 Id. at 743.
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In fact, Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar’s argument may in some ways be
stronger in this context than in its original setting. Bar-Gill and BenShahar rightly acknowledge, in the plea bargaining context, that
prosecutors’ budgets are endogenous, and may increase if plea
bargaining were abolished, allowing prosecutors to pursue more
cases. 185 In the context of retail theft, we can actually observe the
counterfactual—the world without retail justice. We know that, in the
absence of retail justice, retailers and prosecutors in fact have declined
to prosecute many suspects.
At the same time, the arrest rate in this counterfactual world is still
fairly high.186 And the threat of even more arrests—if suspects were to
boycott retail justice—is more credible than the threat of more
prosecutions in the case of plea bargaining, as arrests are cheaper than
prosecutions. This matters because the expected costs of an arrest
alone—with
its
concomitant
physical
risk
and
collateral
consequences187—are likely higher for most suspects than the costs of
paying a retail justice company and completing its course. All the more
so once we factor in the chance of prosecution conditional on arrest, and
if we think most suspects presented with the dilemma, all of whom pass
a criminal-history check, are risk averse.188
2.

Equality: Are Certain Groups of Suspects Worse Off?

Even if retail justice is a good deal for most suspects, concerns may
persist if its effects are discriminatory on the basis of race, class, or
some other morally irrelevant characteristic.
Notice that one’s
conclusion on the former issue frames the latter: if retail justice is a
“good,” we should ensure that it’s not being reserved to the privileged
classes; if retail justice is a “bad,” however, our concern is that it’s being
forced upon disfavored groups. Based on the foregoing analysis, I
proceed on the former assumption: that retail justice is generally
beneficial because it prevents harmful contact with the criminal justice
system.
Id. at 769.
Shoplifting Statistics, supra note __ (reporting fifty-percent arrest rate).
187 See supra notes __.
188 Whether retail justice companies coerce suspects may depend on how we
envision suspects’ fate in the absence of retail justice. Should we focus on the
“normal or usual course of events” for suspects in a statistical sense, see, e.g.,
Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 101, 116 (Peter
Laslett et al. eds., 1972), or the suspect-specific question of “what would have
happened in this case,” see, e.g., Scott Altman, A Patchwork Theory of Blackmail,
141 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1642 (1993)? Even Altman acknowledges that, when
making broad policy decisions, we may need to protect the welfare of the many
suspects and sacrifice the few. See id. at 1650.
185
186
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The appropriate baseline for an analysis of distributive effects is the
manner in which the criminal justice system distributes criminality
within the large pool of individuals who cause others harm. Sociologist
John Hagan distinguishes between “suite” criminals, whose harmful
and immoral acts are frequently treated as noncriminal matters, and
“street” criminals, whose similarly motivated conduct is branded as
deviant.189 A similar dynamic marks the early history of retail theft,
where “kleptomania” or private payments shielded well-to-do ladies
from the criminal justice system, while poorer offenders went to jail.190
Some contemporary shoplifting research suggests that lower-class
offenders continue to be treated more harshly than wealthier ones, and
there may be age and race effects as well.191
Against this baseline, retail justice companies appear, at first blush,
to promote equality by “leveling up,” extending to low-status individuals
the lenient treatment previously withheld from them.192 Retail justice,
that is, shelters not “suite” criminals but “street” criminals, and not just
wealthy shoplifters, but poor ones as well. And on its face, at least, it
applies even-handedly to suspects of every race and gender.193
There are, however, reasons to be cautious in this assessment. I
quickly sketch out five. Of the five, three, I believe, can be safely put to
bed, in the weak sense that they do not reveal retail justice to be worse
than the system that operates in its absence. The same may be true of
the remaining two, but I am less confident. (Accordingly, I will
recommend in Part III that lawmakers require retail justice companies
to collect data that will facilitate close monitoring of these distributive
effects.)
The first concern stems from the fact that shoplifting is a “middleclass crime.” One might worry that retail justice coddles the middle
class while neglecting the truly poor—who may commit other forms of
theft—replicating the regressive class dynamic Hagan describes, just
lower down the economic ladder. Yet, if the research is to be believed,
retailers already favor the middle class over the poor.194 Perhaps more
important, shoplifting is a “middle-class crime” only in the sense that
the middle class is overrepresented in the population of offenders. In
See generally JOHN HAGAN, WHO ARE THE CRIMINALS? (2012).
See supra __.
191 See supra __.
192 Cf. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 10 (2003).
193 See Landes & Posner, supra note __, at 41 (“[S]elective or discriminatory
enforcement … would be eliminated under a regime of private enforcement. The
law would be enforced against everyone who violated it and enforcement would not
place a particular … individual at an unfair disadvantage.”).
194 See supra __.
189
190
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absolute number, more shoplifters hail from the lowest income bracket
than any other.195
Second, shifting from public to “offender-funded” private justice
transfers the costs of shoplifting, in a rough sense, from taxpayers to
suspects. This cost structure may disproportionately burden the
poorest suspects.
More than that, retail justice may simply be
inaccessible to the very poor, who cannot afford the enrollment fees.
Retail justice companies purport to make their programs accessible to
all through a combination of payment plans, discounts, and “tuition
scholarships.” CEC says that ninety percent of suspects presented with
the option choose to enroll. But we don’t know why the other ten
percent do not or, relevant here, how many decline due to financial
constraints.
The premise of this second point is false, however: public justice,
too, makes its “users” foot the bill. “As criminal justice costs have
skyrocketed,” Laura Appleman observes, criminal justice institutions
have begun to impose “fees and fines at every turn,” and thus “the
burden to fund the system has fallen largely on the system’s users,
primarily the poor or indigent.”196 Just as the fees paid to retail justice
companies disproportionately harm the poorest suspects, so, too, do the
criminal justice system’s fees. 197 Even publicly funded counsel is no
longer free in most jurisdictions.198 Those who truly cannot pay spend
years fighting their debts or, worse yet, are jailed for nonpayment,
leading observers to lament the return of debtors’ prisons.199
Third, it’s not known where, geographically, retail justice companies
operate. We do know that they service retailers frequented by both the
wealthy (e.g., Bloomingdales) and less well off (e.g., Walmart). But we
don’t know which Walmart stores, for example, use their services. If
the stores are situated primarily in (relatively) wealthier regions, or
areas with racial demographics that skew white, then retail justice may
be sheltering those populations disproportionately, with economically or
racially regressive effects. And because it’s private industry that’s
choosing whom to protect, there’s no obvious mechanism through which
an angry public can hold the responsible parties to account.
195 See Blanco et al., supra note __, at 906 tbl.1 (reporting that 43.95% of
shoplifters have personal income under $20,000 and 22.37% have family income
under $20,000).
196 Appleman, supra note __, at 1485.
197 See id. (“[F]unding of the criminal justice system has disproportionately
fallen on those least able to pay.”).
198 See, e.g., Helen A. Anderson, Penalizing Poverty: Making Criminal
Defendants Pay for Their Court-Appointed Counsel Through Recoupment and
Contribution, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323 (2009); Beth A. Colgan, Paying for
Gideon, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1929 (2014).
199 See, e.g., Appleman, supra note __, at 1489-92.
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Note, however, that we are not especially demanding of our criminal
justice institutions in this respect. While selective enforcement and
prosecution are prohibited, courts have made discrimination virtually
impossible for defendants to prove.200 And we certainly don’t demand
equality across jurisdictions as opposed to within them. If the criminal
justice authorities in heavily black City A decide to enforce shoplifting
laws to the hilt, for instance, while mostly white City B’s authorities are
far more lenient, a black shoplifting defendant in City A cannot point to
City B in support of a selective-prosecution claim. (That’s not to say the
law has this right, however, and, in Part III, I advocate data collection
that would permit review of precisely this type of disparity within retail
justice.)
And now for the two concerns I can’t quite put to rest: One is that
the retail justice apparatus may enable or encourage store security to
be more aggressive in ways that bear disproportionately on disfavored
groups. This is not inevitable—one can imagine a world in which store
security do not change how they patrol when retailers shift from public
to private justice. If retail justice companies pay retailers or security
firms for each enrollee, however, these payments may, as San Francisco
alleges, “encourage[] security companies … to target not just
individuals who may have shoplifted, but those who are most likely to
fear getting turned over to the police” (who, presumably, are most likely
to enroll). 201
It’s not entirely clear what San Francisco has in mind as the target
population. The dynamics are complex. Different social groups may
dread police contact for different reasons—the fear of physical
mistreatment (perhaps highest among young black males), for example,
versus the fear of deep social and professional embarrassment (perhaps
highest among wealthy, middle-aged, white professionals), versus the
fear of deportation (for undocumented immigrants). One might just as
well assume security guards would target individuals they think are
most likely to be able to pay retail justice enrollment costs—those who
appear to have money to spare. Data collection is necessary to resolve
this concern with any confidence.
Finally, there is the fact that, after querying both internal and
public records, retail justice companies refer repeat offenders to the
See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996); Bonita R.
Gardner, Separate and Unequal: Federal Tough-on-Guns Program Targets
Minority Communities for Selective Enforcement, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 305, 318-19
(2007).
201 Complaint, supra note __, at 2; see id. at 5 (“At particular risk of
exploitation are those individuals who a security guard perceives would be most
likely to buckle under CEC’s high-pressure tactics, perhaps out of fear of being
turned over to law enforcement.”).
200
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police. This is a sensible approach to deterrence: prior sanctions failed,
suggesting the need for harsher medicine. Yet the practice bakes in
whatever biases infected earlier interactions with enforcement
authorities.
If we believe the police (public or private)
disproportionately target black men, for example202—or that customers
are more likely to report apparent thefts by blacks than whites203—then
a suspect’s prior record depends in part on his race. By relying on this
measure, the retail justice companies discriminate as well.
How this compares to the alternative, however, is an empirical
question. Relative to a retailer employing a zero-tolerance policy, which
calls the police on every suspected shoplifter, retail justice companies
may fare poorly. But zero-tolerance policies appear to be rare. More
often, retailers make discretionary decisions, or apply some simple rules
of thumb, to determine when to make the call. Given the discretion
involved—and that one rule of thumb in fact has been to call the police
on repeat offenders—it would not be surprising if bias played more, not
less, of an important role where retail justice is absent. Retail justice
companies, in other words, introduce (or perhaps exacerbate) one
potential bias (from prior police interactions) but eliminate another
(from the discretionary decision of when to call the police). I suspect
that the latter bias swamps the former, but I cannot be sure. Again,
more data are necessary to answer this question.
3.

Overenforcement: The Costs of Casting a Wider Net

The profit motive, critics contend, creates incentives for overzealous
enforcement of the law, possibly sweeping in innocent as well as guilty
defendants. San Francisco’s lawsuit alleges, in this vein, that CEC’s

For evidence suggesting that rates of shoplifting are similar across racial
groups, see supra notes __. For evidence that members of racial minority groups
are nonetheless apprehended for shoplifting at disproportionate rates, see, for
example, Cohen & Stark, supra note __, at 33 fig.1 (finding that black and Mexican
American shoppers were apprehended out of proportion with their presence in the
shopping public); see also George Won & George Yamamoto, Social Structure and
Deviant Behavior: A Study in Shoplifting, 53 SOC. & SOC. RES. 45, 52 tbl.vi (1968)
(same for native Hawaiians); NAT’L COAL. TO PREVENT SHOPLIFTING, supra note __
(discussing survey of 3,550 retailers in which 46% opined that racial minorities
were more prone to shoplift than whites).
203 Cf. Max C. Dertke et al., Observer’s Reporting of Shoplifting as a Function of
a Thief’s Race and Sex, 94 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 213, 217 (1974) (finding no statistically
significant difference in white customers reporting thefts by black versus white
thieves, but that, when prompted to confirm having witnessed a theft, thefts by
blacks were confirmed more often).
202
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“payment structure creates a powerful incentive to pressure people to
enroll in CEC, regardless of the evidence, if any, of their guilt.”204
Academics have debated the basic point for decades. In the 1970s,
Gary Becker and George Stigler sketched out a system in which private
citizens investigate crimes, apprehend and try suspected offenders, and
retain the proceeds, such as fines convicted defendants pay.205 William
Landes and Richard Posner countered that the public monopoly on
criminal law enforcement may be preferable because it enables
“discretionary nonenforcement” of the law by prosecutors.
Discretionary nonenforcement is an efficient way to temper the
(inevitable) overinclusivity of criminal statutes without creating
loopholes for defendants.206
Decades later, the Landes-Posner notion of “discretionary
nonenforcement” became the linchpin of Ric Simmons’ argument to
prohibit (most) private criminal settlements, like the ones retail justice
companies facilitate.
Simmons argues that private criminal
settlements should be illegal because “they remove the prosecutor from
the settlement process.”207 “[T]he prosecutor,” Simmons reasons, “plays
a critical role in selecting which cases should be prosecuted, how they
should be charged, and what sentence is appropriate.”208 “[T]he parties
who negotiate a private criminal settlement,” in contrast, “do not
practice discretionary nonenforcement.”209
As a descriptive matter, I disagree that retail justice companies
usurp the prosecutorial role or edge prosecutors out of the picture.
Prosecutors simply exercise their discretion at the wholesale level.
They are not unaware of what retail justice companies are doing; 210
indeed, at least some prosecutors actively encourage it.211 Prosecutors
Complaint, supra note __, at 2.
Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and
Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974).
206 Landes & Posner, supra note __, at 38-41.
207 Simmons, supra note __, at 1131.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 1187.
210 Telephone Interview with Brian Ashton, supra note __ (explaining that CEC
“always” informs police and prosecutors when they enter a new jurisdiction).
211 See CEC Inform, CEC, https://correctiveeducation.com/home/cec-inform (last
visited Sept. 15, 2017) (“The States Attorneys [sic] office is supportive of any
Retailer’s decisions to implement a Restorative Justice Program.” (quoting Eighth
Judicial Circuit of Florida)); Jessica Pishko, “Restorative Justice” for Shoplifting? A
Court Calls It Extortion, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 30, 2017, 7:00AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/10/30/restorative-justice-for-shoplifting-acourt-calls-it-extortion (“Law enforcement … is supportive in most states ….”); cf.
Carpenter, supra note __ (“Walmart and CEC have been incredible partners in
looking at innovative ways to reduce criminalization and look for alternative
methods in dealing with the ongoing issues related to misdemeanor thefts ….”
204
205
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bent instead on preserving their monopoly might instigate civil or
criminal investigation of retail justice companies,212 publicly threaten to
prosecute shoplifters notwithstanding their participation in the
programs, or possibly lobby for mandatory reporting requirements.213
In a sense, San Francisco’s lawsuit, which seeks to rout retail justice
companies from the jurisdiction, is the exception that proves the rule.214
This descriptive point, even if correct, does not resolve any
normative
concerns
about
overenforcement,
however—most
significantly, whether retail justice encourages the enforcement of
shoplifting laws against innocent suspects, as San Francisco alleges. In
thinking through this problem, it helps to distinguish between “actually
innocent” defendants, who have not in fact violated the law, and
“normatively innocent” defendants, who “did it … [but] did not thereby
offend the public’s moral code.” 215 Normative innocence is a state of
“relative blameworthiness,” resulting from a normative judgment of
whether the defendant “ought to be charged.”216
There are powerful disincentives for store security to target actually
innocent individuals.
The prospect of tort liability for false
imprisonment and related harms undoubtedly looms large, especially
where, as is common, surveillance video has captured the pertinent
events. Retailers, for their part, wish to avoid the negative publicity
wrongful accusations bring about. Indeed, this pair of concerns has
long been thought to motivate retailers’ relatively lax approach toward
shoplifting detection. I see no persuasive evidence that the incentives
retail justice creates, at least to date, are strong enough to turn the
tide.
The harder question concerns the effects of retail justice on
normatively innocent suspects, where the prospect of increased
enforcement seems more plausible. The evidence I have seen, however,
suggests that these suspects are rare.
In their discussion of
(quoting police chief)); Knapp, supra note __ (“Our department and departments
across the country are in favor of programs that are like this ….” (quoting police
official)).
212 See Pishko, supra note __ (“The prosecutor … strongly disagreed with
Walmart’s use of CEC programs, arguing that they are ‘open to abuse’ and should
be illegal”; “he asked the State Attorney General’s office to investigate.”).
213 Cf. Simmons, supra note __, at 960 (“[A] private criminal justice system will
only exist—and can only be effective—at the suffrage of the criminal justice
system.”).
214 Even in San Francisco, I’m told, CEC operated with the knowledge of the
District Attorney, as opposed to the City Attorney who filed suit. Telephone
Interview with Brian Ashton, supra note __.
215 Bowers, supra note __, at 1658 (quoting AKHIL REED AMAR, THE
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 90 (1997)) (alterations in original).
216 Id.
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overenforcement, Landes and Posner were concerned with prohibited
conduct “that the legislature … did not in fact want to forbid.”217 Their
examples involve “minor infractions of the traffic code” and “violations
of building-code provisions that, if enforced, would prevent the
construction of new buildings in urban areas.” 218 Likewise, in his
writings on normative innocence, Josh Bowers focuses on “petty crimes
that typically lack concrete victims,” many of which are “mala prohibita
offenses.”219 Bowers gives examples like “an indigent man … arrested
for hopping a turnstile to get to his first day of work” and “an elderly
man … arrested for selling ice pops without a license on a hot summer
day.”220
As sympathetic as some shoplifters surely are, few, if any, of them
are normatively innocent under these frameworks. There can be little
doubt that the legislature did intend to criminalize even small-ticket
retail thefts by individuals in great need. Nor is shoplifting merely a
victimless, regulatory offense. That so many shoplifters historically
have escaped prosecution very likely reflects judgments about
prosecutorial resource constraints and priorities rather than judgments
about normative innocence the retail justice companies now upset.
Indeed, Bowers concludes that prosecutors typically ignore issues of
normative innocence in petty-crime cases “because of keen institutional
pressures to charge reflexively.”221
A separate overenforcement concern involves concededly guilty
suspects. If the profit motive of retail justice motivates more aggressive
enforcement of shoplifting laws—or greater efficiency enables it—then
retail justice may feed the beast of overcriminalization. For example, a
retailer that, before contracting with a retail justice company, only
rarely called the police, may now sanction a much larger percentage of
suspected shoplifters. This is troubling for those who believe that
society’s principal criminal justice problem is not underenforcement but
its opposite.
There are several reasons, however, that the overcriminalization
argument is more complicated, and probably weaker, than it first
appears. As an initial matter, the very fact that we have criminalized
shoplifting suggests that, setting aside enforcement costs, the efficient
level of shoplifting is zero. 222 That more guilty individuals are

Landes & Posner, supra note __, at 38.
Id.
219 Bowers, supra note __, at 1659, 1666.
220 Id. at 1658.
221 Id. at 1661.
222 See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1548-50
(1984).
217
218
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sanctioned, the argument goes, moves us closer to that ideal, and
cannot count as a demerit for retail justice.223
Readers unpersuaded by that line of argument might consider two
additional points. First, as I mentioned earlier, retailers that work
with retail justice companies—at least with CEC—specify eligibility
criteria including age and item value. 224 I’m informed that many
retailers do not turn over to CEC suspects whom, based on these
criteria, they would not have referred to the police.225 Retail justice, in
other words, does not necessarily lead retailers to cast a wider net.
Second, even if some retailers do now cast a wider net, the
consequences of being ensnared, which involve no criminal-justicesystem contact, are less severe. 226 To put the point differently, we
might just as well say that the net has narrowed in the sense that
fewer, rather than more, shoplifting suspects will enter the criminal
justice system.
B. Are Victims Worse Off?
It might seem odd that retailers, which long have lamented the
scourge of shoplifting, would abandon the criminal justice system in
favor of a more lenient, private alternative. Why wouldn’t retailers
want the strongest deterrent sanctions available?227 Is it possible that,
in opting for retail justice, retailers actually act against self-interest?
It’s possible, but unlikely. These retailers are sophisticated entities
that contract for retail justice under conditions of calm with ample
information. The interesting question is not whether retail justice

223 See Michael Gorr, Liberalism and the Paradox of Blackmail, 21 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 43, 62 (1992) (“That the ‘victim’ [of incriminatory blackmail] may be made
worse off by the prohibition of blackmail is irrelevant for the obvious reason that
crimes do not ordinary deserve to be concealed.”); cf. id. (“[D]isclosure is in fact that
morally preferred state of affairs.”).
224 See supra __.
225 Telephone Interview with Brian Ashton, supra note __.
226 Conditional on having been apprehended, the suspect’s expected sanctions
must be less than in the criminal justice system, or else he will reject any private
settlement offer. Private sanctions, in theory, should reflect the probability that
the prosecutor would decline to prosecute.
Cf. Brown, supra note __
(demonstrating that “allowing blackmail will not necessarily overdeter when
prosecutors exercise discretion to decline prosecution of the blackmailee’s crime,”
id. at 1957, because “the probability of prosecution can affect the blackmailer’s
demand,” id. at 1956).
227 I am assuming here that criminal punishment generally tends to deter
shoplifting. I address the possibility that it doesn’t, see, e.g., Lloyd W. Klemke,
Does Apprehension for Shoplifting Amplify or Terminate Shoplifting Behavior?, 12
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 391, 401 (1978), in Section II.C(2)(a), infra.
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makes retailers better off but why it seems to do so. I’ve touched on
some possibilities above, but a deeper exploration is now in order.
As an initial matter, it’s not actually clear that the premise of the
question I’ve posed—that is, that retailers are embracing a more lenient
approach—is true. The reasons recall the immediately preceding
discussion of overenforcement. It does seem fair to assume that, in an
individual case, criminal sanctions inflict more disutility than the retail
justice companies’ fees and coursework. 228 From the prospective
offender’s viewpoint, however, the relevant question concerns not the
actual but rather the expected sanctions in each system. Expected
sanctions, of course, fold in not only the anticipated magnitude of
sanctions, but also the likelihood of apprehension and the likelihood of
sanctions conditional on apprehension.
Because the mechanism for apprehension—the retailer’s private
police—is held constant across the two systems, the likelihood of
apprehension should be roughly constant as well. It may be slightly
higher in the retail justice setting if the private police use time they
save processing offenders to apprehend additional suspects, 229 or if
they’re given financial incentives to procure retail justice “students.”230
The likelihood of sanctions conditional on apprehension likely rises with
the shift to retail justice, but inconsistently across retailers, depending
upon the criteria used to establish eligibility for enrollment.
All things considered, then, retail justice likely substitutes weaker
but more certain sanctions for stronger, less certain ones. Retail justice
companies also dispense sanctions more swiftly.231 Empirical research
consistently finds the deterrent effect of sanctions to stem more from
certainty and celerity than severity.232 Accordingly, the retail justice
companies’ claims to effective deterrence may be more plausible than
Although the retail justice companies would likely resist the
characterization of their fees as “sanctions,” from the offender’s perspective,
certainly they are that. Cf. KLEMKE, supra note __, at 128 (“These more positive
approaches may still be viewed as punishment by involuntary subjects ….”);
Levmore & Fagan, supra note __, at 2-3. Otherwise, we’d expect there to be a
market, outside the setting discussed here, for the “restorative justice” courses the
retail justice companies administer.
229 See Retailers, TURNING POINT JUSTICE, supra note __ (claiming this benefit).
230 See, e.g., Complaint, supra note __, at 2 (alleging that CEC paid private
police firms ten dollars per enrollee).
231 See Justice System, TURNING POINT JUSTICE, supra note __ (emphasizing the
program’s “immediate consequences that are consistently applied and
proportionate to the offense committed”).
232 See, e.g., Michael Tonry, An Honest Politician’s Guide to Deterrence:
Certainty, Severity, Celerity, and Parsimony, in DETERRENCE, CHOICE, AND CRIME
(Daniel S. Nagin et al. eds. forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2981749
(summarizing research).
228
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they initially appear.233 (The comparative claims may be misleading
nonetheless, given the low baseline rates of recidivism for first-time
shoplifters who are apprehended.234)
In any event, regardless which system better deters potential
shoplifters, the choice to opt for retail justice does make one thing clear:
retailers believe their return on investment in deterrence is higher in
the private than the public system. But this, too, might seem odd, for
economists have long regarded crime deterrence as a classic public
good. 235 Government must provide a criminal justice system, the
argument goes, precisely because private parties will view the returns
as insufficient to motivate adequate investment in deterring crime.
This is because private actors cannot capture all the benefits of their
expenditures on deterrence—if I hire a security guard to patrol in front
of my house at night, my next-door neighbors benefit as well, with no
obligation to contribute.236
In fact, retailers have already paid taxes to finance the police,
prosecutors, courts, and prisons. Why bypass these public institutions?
Retailers that opt out cannot, of course, demand a tax refund. The
obvious answer might be the kickback from retail justice companies,
where available, but I suspect this is ultimately a sideshow; many
retailers continue to work with CEC even absent this minor
remuneration. The better explanation is that, notwithstanding that
retailers have paid taxes, prosecution of shoplifters in the criminal
justice system remains costly and inefficient from the retailers’
perspective. The taxes paid are sunk costs, and what drives retailers
are the costs of going forward.
Assisting in the public prosecution of shoplifting suspects is costly to
retailers in several ways.237 Employees may need to testify or sit for
interviews with police detectives during business hours.
The
merchandise in question may languish in evidence lockers, unavailable
for sale. Frequent visits from the police, to take suspects into custody,
could drive away other customers who see the police as a threat, or as a
signal that criminal activity is afoot. Retailers may even be reluctant to

233 Cf. Levmore & Fagan, supra note __, at 15 (“There will, therefore, be cases
where private agreements provide more deterrence than the criminal law and it is
for this reason that the law ought to tolerate some experimentation with private
agreements in lieu of criminal charges.”).
234 See supra __.
235 See, e.g., Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for
a Criminal Law Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1181, 1201
(1994) (describing the “widely held belief that protection [from crime] is a pure
public good”).
236 See id. at 1202 n.55.
237 See, e.g., Joh, Conceptualizing, supra note __, at 590.
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lose the business of the suspected shoplifter himself, who may double as
a paying customer.
What the retailers receive from the criminal justice system in
return, moreover, often proves too paltry to justify the costs. In many
jurisdictions, shoplifting is a low-priority crime. Police response to calls
can be slow—requiring the retailer to maintain prolonged custody over
the suspect—and prosecution infrequent. 238 The criminal justice
system simply doesn’t provide a service valuable enough—or deterrence
strong enough—to justify the costs of participating in it. Of course, the
quantity of criminal justice resources available to fight shoplifting is not
fixed. In theory, the state could respond to these constraints by sending
help. Indeed, some police departments have hired additional officers
specifically to respond to calls from Walmart.239 Yet this seems not to
be the norm.
In addition, just as in the initial public-good analysis, the retailer
cannot capture all the benefits of its expenditures on deterrence here,
inside the criminal justice system, either. A retailer’s participation
benefits other outlets the suspect may have targeted. In other words,
because victims are required to expend resources (beyond background
taxation) to obtain deterrence through the criminal justice system, and
because those expenditures produce positive externalities, the criminal
justice system has not solved the public-good problem after all.
*

*

*

To nail down the point, and to tee up the next Section’s analysis,
consider who bears the costs of shoplifting under three different
systems of law enforcement.240 In the first, retailers do nothing other
than expel red-handed shoplifters with a warning. They then attempt
to shift the costs of their inventory “shrinkage”—which are relatively
high, given their lackluster effort at deterrence—onto their customers
in the form of increased prices. To the extent that market competition
prevents them from transferring all the expenses, this do-nothing
approach effectively allocates the costs of shoplifting to the retailers
and their customers together.
The second approach—criminal prosecution of some suspects—
spreads the costs more widely. Here, the taxpayers bear the expense of
the justice system’s deterrence-producing institutions, partially offset
by “user fees” collected from suspects and defendants. Retailers assume
238 See Lorelei Laird, Retail Justice: Are Private Education Programs for
Shoplifters a Second Chance—or Extortion?, ABA J., June 2016, at 18.
239 See Barbaro, supra note __; Pettypiece & Voreacos, supra note __ (describing
an officer known to his colleagues as “Officer Walmart”).
240 I set aside the costs of the private police, which are constant.
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the costs of assisting the prosecution as well as the residual costs of
shrinkage, some of which they pass through to their customers.
Finally, consider the retail justice model. Retail justice, recall, is
entirely “offender funded.” The taxpayers bear no enforcement costs
because the criminal justice system’s institutions are not involved in
any way. The retailers bear no enforcement costs, either, as they
simply hand off suspects to the retail justice companies. In fact, the
retailers may make money in the form of kickbacks. The net effect is to
shift costs from retailers, customers, and taxpayers onto the suspects
themselves. It’s not hard to understand why retailers would prefer this
option. And it looks appealing from society’s perspective as well, if it
produces deterrence more efficiently.241
C. Is Society Worse Off?
This last point turns out to be considerably more complex than it
first appears. This Section contemplates the effects of retail justice on
social welfare beyond the interests of suspects and victims. It begins
with a discussion of the social costs of crime, focusing on prevention and
enforcement costs, before pivoting to consider the somewhat more
diffuse (though potentially still significant) effects of decreased
transparency.
1.

The Social Costs of Crime

Society’s goal, within a utilitarian framework, is to minimize the
total social costs of crime, which include the direct costs incurred by
victims plus the costs of prevention and enforcement. 242 In some
settings, private settlement of criminal disputes would raise concerns
about insufficient general deterrence, if victims settle for too little.243
Underdeterrence seems unlikely here, where the “fine” is a multiple of
the average shoplifting take, 244 and where retailers have continued
contact with the offenders. Especially outside the biggest cities,
individuals who shoplift from major retailers likely continue, out of
practical necessity, to patronize those same stores in the future. This
means retailers at least partly internalize the expected costs of
See Levmore & Fagan, supra note __, at 3 (arguing that private settlement
can deter wrongdoers at lower cost than the legal system).
242 See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,
76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 207 (1968).
243 Cf. Landes & Posner, supra note __, at 42.
244 See Clint Rainey & Allegra Hobbs, Been Caught Stealing, N.Y. MAG., Dec. 8,
2013, http://nymag.com/news/intelligencer/topic/shoplifting-2013-12s (reporting
average retail theft of $129).
241
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monitoring and recidivism, motivating them to seek socially efficient
levels of deterrence.245
The more interesting issue concerns prevention and enforcement
costs. Retail justice companies may minimize these costs to retailers,
but they do so partly by externalizing them—that is, by shifting them to
suspects.
This cost externalization may, in some cases, create
incentives for retailers that are perverse from society’s perspective. The
crucial point is that the availability of a costless (or even profitable)
mechanism for adjudicating and sanctioning shoplifting encourages
retailers to favor enforcement when prevention (i.e., victim precautions)
might deter crime more efficiently.
The choice between prevention and enforcement is ubiquitous in
society, yet the pertinent legal literature is surprisingly thin. 246
Potential victims often employ the two strategies simultaneously. I rely
on the criminal justice system to deter home invasions by catching and
punishing burglars, for example, but I also lock my door. The hard
question concerns the socially optimal level of precautions—should I not
only lock my door but also build a moat? Victims, it turns out,
commonly take too few or too many precautions, depending on the
circumstances.
Victims overinvest in precautions that generate negative
externalities, such as diverting crime toward other victims.247 Victims
underinvest, in contrast, in precautions that generate positive
externalities, such as deterring crime against other victims. 248 The
classic example involves competing precautions against auto theft: The
Club, a pole-like device that locks the steering wheel, and Lojack, a
radio transmitter that lets police locate a stolen car. The Club merely
displaces crime to other owners. Not so for Lojack—in fact, because
potential thieves can’t tell which cars have Lojack, Lojack reduces theft
See Levmore & Fagan, supra note __, at 13-14.
See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Harel, supra note __; Harel, supra note __; Robert
A. Mikos, “Eggshell” Victims, Private Precautions, and the Societal Benefits of
Shifting Crime, 105 MICH. L. REV. 307 (2006). There is also a pertinent economics
literature. In addition to papers cited elsewhere, see Ann P. Bartel, An Analysis of
Firm Demand for Protection Against Crime, 4 J. LEGAL. STUD. 443 (1975); Omri
Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, Blaming the Victim: Optimal Incentives for Private
Precautions Against Crime, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 434 (1995); Charles T. Clotfelter,
Private Security and the Public Safety, 5 J. URB. ECON. 388 (1978); Steven Shavell,
Individual Precautions To Prevent Theft: Private Versus Socially Optimal Behavior,
11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 123 (1991).
247 See Ben-Shahar & Harel, supra note __, at 309-11. But see Mikos, supra
note __, at 310 (arguing that crime diversion or displacement is socially beneficial
because it shifts crime away from “eggshell victims,” who suffer relatively high
levels of harm and thus invest more in precautions).
248 See Ben-Shahar & Harel, supra note __, at 311-12.
245
246
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for every car that might have Lojack. The predictable result? “People
buy too many Clubs and not enough Lojacks.”249
Familiar precautions for retailers include strategic lighting and
store layout, security cameras, greeters, well-spaced personnel, item
placement (with small, valuable items out of customer reach), and
security tags.250 Retailers employ these precautions to varying degrees,
and they seem to make a difference. Indeed, data from observational
studies of customers show great variance among stores in rates of
shoplifting.
One interpretation of these data is that “certain
characteristics of stores should … be considered as an important
variable influencing the amount of shoplifting that occurs.”251 “Certain
stores,” that is, “may be viewed as prime targets for shoplifting because
of the nature or quality of merchandise, or because they are seen as
having poor security.”252
While it’s hard to be sure, there is reason to think at least some
retailers employ these measures too sparingly. In an echo of Victorianera rhetoric about the devilish temptations of department stores, that’s
certainly the sense one gets when reading media coverage of Walmart’s
enormous demands on the police. Walmart, some experts say, “lays out
its stores in a way that invites trouble and often doesn’t have enough
uniformed employees to make sure everything runs smoothly.”253 Its
stores “can feel messy and disheveled,” allowing “troublemakers to
249 BARRY NALEBUFF & IAN AYRES, WHY NOT?: HOW TO USE EVERYDAY
INGENUITY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS BIG AND SMALL 24 (2006); see Ian Ayres & Steven
D. Levitt, Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable Victim Precaution:
An Empirical Analysis of Lojack, 113 Q.J. ECON. 43 (1998).
250 See, e.g., KLEMKE, supra note __, at 130-33; SHTEIR, supra note __, at 171-95.
251 KLEMKE, supra note __, at 10 (discussing Abigail Buckle & David P.
Farrington, An Observational Study of Shoplifting, 24 BRITISH J. CRIMINOLOGY 63
(1984)).
252 Id. For direct evidence that precautions reduce shoplifting, see David P.
Farrington et al., An Experiment on the Prevention of Shoplifting, in 1 CRIME
PREVENTION STUDIES 93 (Ronald V. Clarke ed., 1993) (finding that electronic
tagging caused a lasting decrease in shoplifting, store redesign caused an
immediate decrease that wore off, and uniformed guards had no effect); M. Patrick
McNees et al., Shoplifting Prevention: Providing Information Through Signs, 9 J.
APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 399 (1976) (finding that both general and item-specific
signage reduced theft).
253 Sampson et al., supra note __; see also Pettypiece & Voreacos, supra note __
(quoting police criticism of Walmart’s theft-prevention efforts); Scott E. Wolfe &
David C. Pyrooz, Rolling Back Prices and Raising Crime Rates? The Walmart Effect
on Crime in the United States, 54 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 199 (2014) (finding that
crime fell more slowly in the 1990s in counties in which Walmart built stores).
More generally, see Ian J. Abramson, Shoplifting: Fastest-Growing, Hardest-ToControl Crime, VOLUME RETAIL MERCHANDISING, Feb. 1983, at 2 (blaming retailers
for “creating an atmosphere for impulse buyers without adequate security,” and
thereby “encouraging possible customers to indulge in ‘impulse shoplifting’”).
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rationalize that the company doesn’t care.” 254 Journalists found that
Walmart stores call the police far more often than Target stores in the
same jurisdiction, even when controlling for store size and hours of
operation.255 This discrepancy suggests that there is ample room within
a successful business model for greater investment in precautions. And
given that most shoplifting is situational and impulsive, rather than
premeditated, such investment ought to reduce aggregate theft rather
than merely displace it.256
Most often, as in my home-invasion example, the preventionenforcement question concerns the allocation of crime-deterrence
responsibility between private victims and public authorities.257 In the
retail justice context, however, the analysis differs. As noted, retail
justice companies permit retailers to shift deterrence-related costs from
themselves (and their customers) to suspects. Whether this makes
society better off depends on whether retailers or suspects are the “least
cost avoiders.” It’s tempting to think that the answer is obvious—it
must be suspects, who can avoid the costs simply by refraining from
offending (or arousing suspicion). But this misapprehends the real
issue.
As Alon Harel argues, “[t]he identification of the criminal as the
‘cheaper cost avoider’ does indeed mean that it is socially desirable that
criminals avoid carrying out crimes. But given the persistence of
criminal activity, the salient question is who should bear the costs of
preventing such activity.”258 In the traditional case, again, we compare
the cost of victim precautions with the cost of state enforcement. 259
254 Sampson et al., supra note __ ; see CHARLES FISHMAN, THE WAL-MART
EFFECT 203-04 (2006) (describing Walmart’s shopping environment).
255 See Sampson et al., supra note __; see also Pettypiece & Voreacos, supra
note __ (similar).
256 See supra note __.
See generally Rob T. Guerette & Katie J. Bowers,
Assessing the Extent of Crime Displacement and Diffusion of Benefits: A Review of
Situational Crime Prevention Evaluations, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 1331, 1357 (2009)
(reviewing 102 studies and concluding that “crime displacement seems to be the
exception rather than the rule, and it is sometimes more likely that diffusion of
crime-control benefit will occur”).
257 See generally Keith N. Hylton, Optimal Law Enforcement and Victim
Precaution, 27 RAND J. ECON. 197 (1996).
258 Harel, supra note __, at 1198-99. For a different way of framing the issue,
see Hylton, supra note __ (defining “offender precaution” to include “the profits
forgone by an offender who chooses not to commit a crime,” id. at 198 n.9, and
arguing that “[i]f victim precaution is cheaper than offender precaution (or
forbearance), then an optimal punishment policy might require more precautionary
effort from victims and less from offenders,” id. at 198-99 (footnote omitted)).
259 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 239 (7th ed. 2007)
(“Even though the criminal can avoid the injury to the victim at a lower cost than
the victim can, throwing responsibility onto the victim might minimize aggregate
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Here, instead, we compare the cost of victim precautions with the cost
of retail justice enforcement—which, of course, is ultimately financed by
suspects’ fees. Costs in the retail justice model include the expense of
developing and administering the “restorative justice” course, the
creation and maintenance of supportive technology, 260 and the time
spent by suspects taking the course. It seems plausible that these costs
exceed the expense to a retailer of some of the common precautions
mentioned above. In sum, while retail justice may reduce enforcement
costs relative to the criminal justice system, victim precautions might—
in some situations, even if not in many—reduce them even further.
2.

Transparency

By operating wholly outside official institutions, retail justice, some
critics argue, undermines “the community’s collective interest in the
administration of justice as a public event that binds and defines us.”261
More concretely, retail justice frustrates public oversight of the criminal
process, deprives citizens of valuable information about offenders in
their midst, and silences the public condemnation that, on some
theories, differentiates the criminal process from all others. I consider
these three critiques in turn. I then discuss the effects of retail justice
on official crime data.
Notice that, without secrecy, the retailer and suspect never reach a
bargain—secrecy is what the suspect pays for. For these transparency
considerations to win out, then, the benefits of publicity must outweigh
any welfare gains already discussed.262
(a) The Publicity Norm in Criminal Cases. — The public jury trial
remains the gold standard for American criminal justice. In reality,
however, it is the trial’s rarity, not its quality, that makes it precious.
Only a fraction of shoplifting charges lead to public trials; prosecutors
drop some cases, divert others, and plead out most of the rest. Plea
bargaining nominally takes place under the auspices of a public system,
but the deals themselves are struck behind closed doors. Increasingly,

social costs. It costs something, though very little, to lock one’s car—less than it
would cost the criminal justice system to bring the thief to justice.”).
260 See, e.g., CEC, supra note __ (last visited Oct. 18, 2017) (describing program
technologies available on multiple computer platforms).
261 Brown, supra note __, at 1967; see, e.g., Neyfakh, supra note __; Complaint,
supra note __, at 15.
262 See Levmore & Fagan, supra note __, at 3 (“Information is valuable, to be
sure, but the higher price a party pays for secrecy might deter misbehavior as
successfully as any legal remedy, and the latter normally comes at greater social
cost.”).
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the public is excluded even from the parts of the plea process that are
supposed to be transparent.263
It turns out, then, that the public’s ability to audit the criminal
process by observing its institutions at work is illusory, at least in the
mine-run misdemeanor case. Indeed, I have criticized plea bargaining
for precisely this reason.264 It’s far from clear that the shift from plea
bargaining to retail justice meaningfully exacerbates the problem. At
most, the difference is one of degree.
On the second point—that retail justice deprives the public of useful
information about offenders, preventing, for example, the identification
of potentially troublesome recidivists265—the realities of criminal justice
once again blunt the critique. Recall, first, that, in a world without
retail justice, many retailers call the police infrequently, often
banishing suspected offenders from the store instead. Of the suspects
who are arrested, many will escape formal charges or obtain diversion,
leaving behind records of questionable utility for tracking repeat
offenders.266
Moreover, retail justice companies keep records for precisely this
purpose—to identify and screen out repeat offenders. To be sure, unless
retailers pool information, this technique will catch only shoplifters who
reoffend at the same retailer or another retailer that contracts with the
same retail justice company, so coverage is admittedly imperfect.267 But
the system likely captures a great number of cases, and the ones that
slip through the cracks probably present little serious danger.268
Confidentiality of offense records, however, has another implication
that’s not so easily minimized. Confidentiality may inadvertently
increase statistical discrimination against black males seeking

263 See Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World,
127 HARV. L. REV. 2173 (2014).
264 See John Rappaport, Unbundling Criminal Trial Rights, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
181, 198 (2015).
265 This is a point Levmore and Fagan stress.
See, e.g., Levmore & Fagan,
supra note __, at 2-3; see also Murat C. Mungan, The Scope of Criminal Law, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note __, at 51, 57
(“Criminal law … has the function of producing information concerning a convict’s
attitude towards the rest of society and his preferences…. Hence, criminal law may
allow other members of society to alter their behavior towards the ex-convict and
take low-cost targeted precautions against him.”).
266 See, e.g., KLEMKE, supra note __, at 128; Konig, supra note __.
267 See Grover C. Trask, California’s Business Community Restorative Justice
Precomplaint Education Program for Petty Theft Offenders 3 (July 31, 2013),
https://www.correctiveeducation.com/home/uploads/
BBK%20White%20Paper%20MJM%20Edits%2013.07.31.pdf.
268 See Blanco et al., supra note __, at 901 tbl.2 (showing that individuals who
self-report shoplifting report low rates of violent behavior).
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employment. 269 If prospective employers—particularly retailers, one
might think—cannot be confident whether an applicant has shoplifted,
they may rely on less accurate and more odious proxies for criminality,
such as race. Landlords, colleges, and other institutions that screen for
criminal records may do the same. In short, even if confidentiality
helps black males who have shoplifted once, the evidence suggests it
harms black males whose records are clean, with the net effect
dependent upon “the size of each effect and the size of the respective
groups they affect.”270
The third transparency concern: Henry Hart famously theorized
that conduct is “criminal” precisely when (and because) it incurs the
“moral condemnation of the community.”271 Retail justice precludes the
collective act of public disdain.272 Is this a serious knock against it?
We might ask first whether, in the most practical sense, retail
justice dampens the message of condemnation the legislature sought to
convey by criminalizing shoplifting. This is an empirical question and,
for reasons related to the discussion of deterrence above, it’s not clear
the answer is yes. If, absent retail justice, the criminal prohibition
against shoplifting is grossly underenforced, then retail justice, by
potentially reaching more offenders, may actually amplify rather than
muffle the criminal law’s message in a practical sense—at least to the
principal audience whose behavior it’s designed to control. One thing
retail justice companies do, after all, is underscore the social harms that
shoplifting inflicts.273 And this seems, significantly, to satisfy retailers’
retributive appetite.
Still, the administration of retail justice involves no public
disapproval of the offender. It’s reasonable to assume this is a problem.
For one thing, holding all else equal, it weakens deterrence.274 It also
interferes with “one of the state’s most important tasks in articulating
and enforcing the criminal law: declaring societal norms in public and
labeling as ‘criminal’ the behavior that runs afoul of them.” 275 Yet
269 See Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and
Statistical Discrimination: A Field Experiment, __ Q.J. ECON. __ (forthcoming
2017); Harry J. Holzer, Perceived Criminality, Criminal Background Checks, and
the Racial Hiring Practices of Employers, 49 J.L. & ECON. 451 (2006).
270 Agan & Starr, supra note __, at __.
271 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401, 405 (1958).
272 See Simmons, supra note __, at 1165-66; Brown, supra note __, at 1970-71
(arguing that private settlement of criminal matters is inappropriate because it
removes the official sanction and condemnation of the state).
273 See, e.g., C.A. Partnership Program, TURNING POINT JUSTICE, supra note __.
274 See Hylton, supra note __, at 13 (“[E]xposure of a crime is a separate
punishment by itself.”).
275 Brown, supra note __, at 1970-71.
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maybe that’s the wrong inference to draw. Perhaps the stronger
inference is that the public authorities, which (San Francisco aside)
seem at least complicit in the operation of retail justice, don’t believe
that most first-time shoplifters deserve public condemnation.
As Part I showed, the historical record reflects longstanding
ambivalence toward the offense. Legislatures could, after all, enact
mandatory reporting statutes to ensure the private police send every
suspected shoplifter to the public system. But they don’t. Nor has any
made a move to ban retail justice from the marketplace.276 Perhaps,
then, it’s best to conceptualize what’s happening here as a novel species
of decriminalization. There are entirely sensible reasons one might
favor such a policy, including the belief that it will reduce, rather than
elevate, the rate of subsequent criminal offending.277
(b) Crime Data. — A somewhat different concern is that retail
justice distorts official crime data.
Every suspect retail justice
companies poach is a statistic that won’t show up in public data
recording offenses known to the police, let alone arrests or convictions.
Jurisdictions in which retail justice companies thrive will therefore
publish crime rates that are artificially depressed. Shoplifting is
reported in official FBI crime data as “larceny-theft,” which, in turn,
constitutes the largest component of the umbrella category “property
crime.”278
To be sure, even absent the effects of retail justice, selective
reporting and prosecution plague official shoplifting data. 279 Various
shoplifting “epidemics,” for instance, may not have been epidemics at all
but rather the manifestation of changes in retailer behavior, i.e.,

276 The Minnesota legislature, however, is reportedly considering the question.
Carpenter, supra note __.
277 See, e.g., CAMERON, supra note __, at 165 (arguing that there may be “a
strong argument in favor of keeping pilferers out of jail lest they receive there the
kinds of knowledge and emotional support they need to become ‘successful’
commercial thieves”); Klemke, supra note __, at 401 (finding that apprehension and
police contact each increased subsequent shoplifting among juveniles); see also
Samuel Walker, Reform the Law: Decriminalization, in DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 678,
679 (Edward J. Clarke ed., 7th ed. 2008) (describing the theory that “any contact
with the system … imposes a ‘criminal label’ on the individual,” who “internalizes
the label and proceeds to act out the role, committing additional and more serious
crimes”).
278 See Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Larceny-theft, CRIME
IN THE UNITED STATES, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.2010/property-crime/larcenytheftmain (last visited Oct. 26, 2017); id., Property
Crime,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/propertycrime (last visited Oct. 26, 2017).
279 This is a point Mary Owen Cameron rightly stressed in her influential 1964
work. See CAMERON, supra note __, at 23-24.
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increases in the rate of apprehension and police referral.280 To some
extent, though, this dynamic exists for all but the most serious crimes,
which are reported and prosecuted more consistently. 281 There’s no
reason to think these background measurement errors are distributed
unevenly across jurisdictions in any significant way. Retail justice, in
contrast, concentrates and magnifies the effects. If a small city’s
Walmart switches from an aggressive police referral policy to CEC, for
example, the drop in official property crime statistics could be
instantaneous and significant without any change in the underlying
crime rate.
Crime data are central to a variety of personal and policy decisions
in contemporary society.282 Families consult crime rates when choosing
where to settle.283 Academics use them to research the determinants of
crime and potential solutions. 284 Governments allocate funds with
crime rates in mind.285 Police officials are evaluated partly on their
ability to drive crime down.286 When retail justice distorts crime data,
it warps these personal and policy decisions too. That’s not to say the
effect cuts in any clear direction—it depends on local needs and
incentives. Law enforcement, for example, may support retail justice
where it perceives the benefits from depressing crime rates to outweigh
the cost of resources foregone—or vice versa.

280 See, e.g., KLEMKE, supra note __, at 8; Hindelang, supra note __, at 584
(finding that, due to changes in the rate at which retailers called the police, the
police would have observed a 32% increase in shoplifting from 1963 to 1968 even if
the number of offenders hadn’t changed).
281 See JAYNE E. ROBINSON & MICHAEL R. RAND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2008, at tbl.91 (2011),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus/current/cv0891.pdf
(estimating
that
41.9% of crimes are reported).
282 See generally MODERNIZING CRIME STATISTICS 85-102 (Janet L. Lauritsen &
Daniel L. Cork eds., 2016).
283 See, e.g., Crime Statistics, CITY-DATA, http://www.city-data.com/crime (last
visited Aug. 2, 2017).
284 See CAMERON, supra note __ (asserting that “the operation of private police
represents a challenging problem in the field of criminology,” id. at 61, because of
its effect on crime statistics, which are the “basic data on which theories of crime
causation are built,” id. at 174).
285 See MODERNIZING CRIME STATISTICS, supra note __, at 91-94.
286 See generally JOHN A. ETERNO & ELI B. SILVERMAN, THE CRIME NUMBERS
GAME: MANAGEMENT BY MANIPULATION (2012) (describing incentives for police to
manipulate crime statistics).
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D. Isn’t This Blackmail?
According to the California court ruling on San Francisco’s lawsuit,
CEC’s business model is “textbook extortion.” 287 Whether that
determination is correct as a matter of California law is a question
better left to other fora. Answering it, in any event, would not resolve
the legality of retail justice under other states’ blackmail statutes.288
The more fruitful inquiry is whether the justifications for prohibiting
blackmail support banning retail justice. What makes this tricky is the
substantial dissensus on whether and why blackmail should be illegal
in the first place. 289 It would take a lengthy detour to address the
competing theories, or even just the leading ones, so I take license to
jump immediately to what seems to me the literature’s strongest
candidate.
The theorist who comes closest, in my view, to supporting a ban on
retail justice is James Lindgren. Lindgren understands blackmail as
“the seeking of an advantage by threatening to press an actual or
potential dispute that is primarily between the blackmail victim and
someone else.”290 Crime-exposing blackmail, to Lindgren, thus consists
of “bargaining with the state’s chip,” 291 which is “unfair in that the
threatener uses leverage that is less his than someone else’s.”292 It also
“involves suppressing the state’s interests.”293 Lindgren, that is, “would
outlaw blackmail because it harms third parties”—here, the state—“by
compromising their rights.”294
I am inclined to cast my lot with Lindgren’s critics, including
Jennifer Gerarda Brown and Ric Simmons, who observe that “the
blackmailer ‘appropriates’ the state’s leverage but also creates some
deterrence value that inures to the benefit of the general public.” 295
People ex rel. Herrera v. Corrective Education Co., No. CGC-15-549094, slip
op. at 3 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug. 14, 2017) (ordering granting summary judgment in
part).
288 Cf. Simmons, supra note __, at 1141 (“[M]ost states prohibit incriminating
blackmail altogether, but a few allow the practice in limited circumstances.”
(footnote omitted)).
289 See Mitchell N. Berman, Blackmail, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 37, 37 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., 2011)
(“What, if anything, justifies the criminalization of blackmail, and what should be
the contours of the offense, have long been among the most delighting and devilish
puzzles of criminal law theory.”).
290 Lindgren, supra note __, at 703.
291 Id. at 702; cf. Landes & Posner, supra note __, at 43.
292 Lindgren, supra note __, at 703.
293 Id. at 672.
294 Brown, supra note __, at 1963.
295 Id. at 1965.
287
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“Nothing is actually being ‘stolen’ from the state,” in other words;
rather, the blackmailer “is advancing the state’s goals (at least part of
the way) and saving the state money.”296
One can also read Lindgren as concerned with the blackmailer’s
unjust gain rather than the blackmail victim’s loss.297 Indeed, I suspect
this reading, more than any other theory, captures our intuition about
what seems wrong with retail justice: even if we posit that retail justice
benefits suspects, victims, and society more broadly (by efficiently
deterring shoplifting), why should retail justice companies be permitted
to profit from appropriating the state’s leverage?
As Mitchell Berman has argued, however, and as Lindgren later
conceded, 298 Lindgren’s unjust-gain theory is better at describing
blackmail than justifying its prohibition.
“Lindgren provides no
reason,” Berman writes, “why use of someone else’s leverage for
individual gain should be made unlawful, let alone criminal.” 299
“Furthermore,” Berman adds, “if the use of such leverage is wrongful,
it’s not clear why the squandering of another’s chips—by deciding
neither to threaten nor to make a given disclosure—is not likewise
wrongful and thus properly criminalizable.”300
III. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Close examination of retail justice paints a finer picture than
popular press accounts can afford. Even a casual observer can compile
a laundry list of qualms about the industry, as I did when I first
296 Simmons, supra note __, at 1156. Indeed, it is not completely clear that
Lindgren would oppose the retail justice model. Lindgren allows that “permit[ting]
one to threaten exposure of a … crime when honestly seeking restitution in a
matter related to the exposure … may be an appropriate rule” under his theory,
“since the threatener’s personal interest is likely to be substantial when the claim
pressed is related to the information threatened to be exposed.” Lindgren, supra
note __, at 715. The issue, to Lindgren, would largely turn on whether the retail
justice companies’ fees exceed “any reasonable restitution.” Id.
297 See JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING 363 n.45 (1988); Brown, supra
note __, at 1963-64.
298 James Lindgren, Blackmail: An Afterword, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1975, 1988
(1993).
299 Berman, supra note __, at 54 (emphasis added); see also Joel Feinberg, The
Paradox of Blackmail, 1 RATIO JURIS 83, 83-85 (1988) (arguing that an undeserved
gain is insufficient, in a liberal society, to justify criminalization where there is no
corresponding harm); cf. HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 26
(2004) (arguing that unjust enrichment is not a legal argument but a “loose
framework as well as an invitation for normative inquiry”); Emily Sherwin,
Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX.
L. REV. 2083 (2001) (similar).
300 Berman, supra note __, at 54-55.
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encountered it. But no shorter is the list of (well-founded) grievances
about public criminal justice. After careful reflection, I am not
persuaded that retail justice is clearly worse than its public
counterpart, and in several important respects it may be better.
This conclusion holds, however, only if certain conditions—
suggested in the preceding discussion and crystallized in this Part—are
met. The normative valence of retail justice, that is, depends upon
empirical facts about how it is implemented and the environments in
which it operates. Rather than ignoring retail justice or trying to stamp
it out, lawmakers can help ensure that it operates fairly by regulating it
in the following respects.
First, in most circumstances, the availability of retail justice makes
many shoplifting suspects better off by allowing them to opt out of the
criminal justice system, with all its dangers and lingering legal
consequences. The exceptional case is one in which the suspect harbors
misconceptions about the criminal justice system—believing the
expected sanctions to be harsher than they really are—and thus
artificially inflates the benefits of avoidance. So, while retail justice
should not be prohibited under the banner of protecting suspects’
interests, the state should ensure that retail justice companies do not
mislead suspects about the severity of the criminal justice option. If
resources for enforcing this anti-fraud rule are scarce, they should be
focused on jurisdictions in which criminal justice is particularly lenient,
where the risk of misapprehension is highest.301
Second, in many settings, society might prefer retail justice to
criminal justice because it generates deterrence more efficiently.
Essentially, the “tuition” fees suspects pay to retail justice companies
serve as fines that are administered at lower cost than criminal justice
sanctions. If, however, retailers could prevent crime even more cheaply
by investing in precautions, then retail justice allows retailers to pursue
private gains at the expense of social welfare, and should be curtailed.
The difficulty is how to identify these settings. One possibility is to
require retailers to demonstrate compliance with industry best
practices for loss prevention as a condition on opting into retail
justice.302 In the long run, one could even imagine a municipal “loss
A more aggressive approach might be to require Miranda-style warnings
that inform the suspect about the rate at which prosecutors in the jurisdiction
pursue charges against first-time shoplifters, the range and distribution of
sentences upon conviction, and the procedural rights available to arrestees and
defendants.
302 See, e.g., Loss Prevention Found., How Loss Prevention Audits Are Used,
LPM INSIDER (July 17, 2017), http://losspreventionmedia.com/insider/inventoryshrinkage/lp101-how-loss-prevention-audits-are-used-2 (“The purpose [of a lossprevention audit] is to reinforce guiding principles and practices that should
301
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prevention code,” akin to a fire code, applicable to retailers above a
certain size.
Third, because it buries criminal violations, retail justice distorts
official crime data. Given the great interest in, and manifold uses of,
these data in contemporary society, states should require retail justice
companies to publish aggregate data about the cases they process. One
analogy is the Clery Act, 303 which regulates the reporting of campus
crime. While colleges and universities are not required to call the local
police whenever they learn about crimes committed on campus, the
Clery Act does obligate them to keep and disclose information about
certain offenses. Institutions subject to the Clery Act must track and
publish crime statistics and maintain public logs with details about
each such incident brought to their attention.304 Clery Act offenses are
more serious than shoplifting; nevertheless, given the volume and
economic impact of retail theft, reasonable people (say, prospective
business owners) may value aggregate shoplifting data in planning
their affairs.305
Fourth, the distributive effects of retail justice are ultimately
indeterminate. Many of the potential racial and economic biases that
concern critics of retail justice manifest to the same degree in the
criminal justice system.
It is possible that retail justice could
exacerbate bias—for instance, by incorporating (and then replicating)
bias from suspects’ prior interactions with the police. Yet this is true
only if this bias is stronger than the biases of retailers that exercise
discretion in determining when to call the police, many of which may
look at the suspect’s record in addition to other personal characteristics.
This seems unlikely, though vigilance is appropriate given the stakes.
Data reporting by retail justice companies should therefore include
information on the race and gender of suspects, as well as the locations
of operation, to allow for state and public monitoring of disparate
impacts.
Finally, because, under ordinary circumstances, retail justice has
the potential to make everyone better off, prosecutors should refrain
from enforcing blackmail laws against the retail justice industry, absent
particularized concerns including those flagged throughout Part II. In
already be familiar to those being audited and evaluate compliance with known
standards of performance.”).
303 Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime
Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-542, 104 Stat. 2384 (1990) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §
1092(f)).
304 See id.
305 See, e.g., MODERNIZING CRIME STATISTICS, supra note __, at 98 (“Businesses
may use UCR crime data to learn about the nature and extent of problems in the
cities or communities in which they operate or are considering for expansion or
relocation opportunities.”).
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the long run, if the retail justice experiment is successful, lawmakers
might consider amending blackmail laws, where necessary, to ensure
they do not prohibit the practice.
IV. EXTENSIONS
Beyond its parochial significance, the study of retail justice
generates fresh perspectives on some important criminal justice issues.
This Part draws out several such points. Section A extracts lessons for
institutional design from the discussion in Section II.C of victims’
incentives to take precautions. Section B demonstrates how retail
justice challenges conventional views about police and prosecutorial
motives. Finally, Section C speculates about the possible next frontiers
of private criminal dispute resolution.
A. Lessons for Criminal Justice System Design
Recall the conclusion that, while retail justice may reduce the sum
of prevention and enforcement costs relative to the criminal justice
system, victim precautions might reduce costs even further. This
insight extends in interesting directions. Most economically minded
legal scholarship on criminal justice, as noted earlier, analyzes
offenders’ incentives alone. Only a handful of writers discuss the role of
victim precautions in reducing crime. They have emphasized the ways
in which the substantive criminal law is, or could be, used to encourage
efficient precautions. For example, the tendency of the criminal law to
punish attempts more leniently than completed crimes can be
understood as a way of discouraging excessive private investment in
precautions, which, by thwarting some completed crimes, turn them
into mere attempts.306
What is true of the substantive criminal law is also true of criminal
procedure and the design of criminal justice institutions. Just as the
rules of criminal law can alter victims’ incentives to invest in
precautions, so can other aspects of the criminal process. When returns
on participation in the criminal justice system increase sufficiently from
the victim’s perspective, the victim will begin to rely on the criminal
justice system where previously he would have invested in
precautions—even where precautions remain more cost-effective from

See Ben-Shahar & Harel, supra note __, at 341-42; see also Harel, supra
note __, at 1211-26 (discussing provocation, the “no retreat” rule, and the
classification of property crimes).
306
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society’s vantage point. Precautions and public law enforcement are
substitutes, as others have noted.307
This substitution effect, in turn, generates two observations. First,
in contexts in which cost-effective precautions against crime are
available, a criminal process that is costly and cumbersome from the
victim’s perspective—while doubtless frustrating to the victim—may be
socially beneficial if it encourages victims to invest in efficient
precautions.308 Second, wholly apart from the many other downsides of
an overweening criminal justice system,309 an outsized apparatus may
have the additional, unrecognized disadvantage of discouraging certain
victims from taking socially efficient precautions. There are important
(and illuminating) limits on the reach of this argument, which I will
address, but first let me illustrate the basic point.
Suppose the police in my neighborhood excel at catching bicycle
thieves—they have ample manpower and spare no expense in tracking
down a stolen bike. Suppose they’ve also made it simple for me to file a
bicycle-theft report via a smartphone application. In this world, it’d be
sorely tempting not to spend money on a professional-grade lock for my
bike and not to go out of my way to find a rack every time I need to
park. If my bike disappears, I’ll file a report and the police will get my
bike back—using taxpayer resources far greater than the lock and
minor route deviations would have cost me.
Now suppose there’s no convenient smartphone app—to file a theft
report, I have to get myself to the police station, wait in line, provide
ownership documentation, and fill out a bunch of paperwork. That lock
and those bike racks start to look much more attractive, a salutary
development from society’s perspective. Similarly, suppose that filing a
report remains easy but the likelihood of recovery is greatly reduced
because the police department is resource-constrained.
Again,

I am not the first to make this observation, see, e.g., Charles T. Clotfelter,
Public Services, Private Substitutes, and the Demand for Protection Against Crime,
67 AM. ECON. REV. 867 (1977); Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, The
Economic Epidemiology of Crime, 39 J.L. & ECON. 405 (1996), but it has received
little attention in criminal justice scholarship.
308 A similar point may hold for criminal-procedure protections like the
reasonable-doubt rule, which reduce expected returns on victim participation in the
criminal process.
309 See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVES ON INCARCERATION AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 43-45, 50-52
(2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/
20160423_cea_incarceration_criminal_justice.pdf (documenting direct government
spending on the criminal justice system along with costs imposed on offenders’
families and communities); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass
Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004).
307
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investment in private precautions begins to sound more appealing,
which is socially beneficial.
That the criminal justice system and private precautions are
substitutes tells us something not only about the size or type of criminal
justice system we might want, but also how to allocate enforcement
resources within that system. More specifically, the desire to avoid
distorting victim incentives supplies an argument for directing
enforcement resources toward certain victims and crimes rather than
others.
Regarding victims, there is no concern about reducing
investment incentives among individuals who lack the resources to
make the investments in the first place. In other words, while a cheap,
effective criminal process may reduce investment in socially efficient
precautions among the wealthy (like retailers), it’s unlikely to affect the
spending patterns of the poor. The debate about whether the criminal
law is over- or underenforced in poor communities—especially poor
communities of color—is fraught and complex. 310 I mean to suggest
only that the victim-precaution angle supplies one argument in favor of
those who would prefer greater enforcement in these settings.
Just as the substitution argument may apply to some victims but
not others, the same is true for crimes. Here, too, it makes sense to
allocate criminal justice enforcement resources where they will not lead
victims to forego spending on socially efficient precautions. In some
contexts, for example, there may be no accessible, efficient precautions
because available precautions are ineffective or unduly expensive (in
either financial or personal terms). In other contexts, the private
harms of victimization—which ordinarily are not compensated through
the criminal process—may be so substantial that victims will continue
to take precautions even when law enforcement is effective and
inexpensive for the victim.
*
*
*
The preceding discussion may help make sense of public hostility
toward Walmart’s heavy demands on the criminal justice system. As a
taxpayer, Walmart is entitled to some basic level of public protection,
regardless whether it takes socially efficient precautions to prevent
crime on its premises. But when it begins to make excessive demands
on the criminal justice system—demands, perhaps, beyond those it
would make if it did take efficient precautions—then continuing to
meet those demands begins to look more like (regressive) redistribution

310 See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997); Tracey L.
Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A
Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197; David Thacher, The
Distribution of Police Protection, 27 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 275 (2011).
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than merely spreading the costs of crime across the tax base.311 At this
point, it only seems right that Walmart itself, or the consumers who
choose to patronize it, pay the excess. By reducing the value of criminal
justice assistance to Walmart, we may encourage Walmart to shift its
deterrence strategy away from enforcement and toward prevention.
B. Police and Prosecutorial Motives
Acquiescence in retail justice, I argued in Section II.C.2, may best be
understood as an exercise, rather than abdication, of police and
prosecutorial discretion. It’s discretion at the wholesale level. But why
are the public authorities exercising their discretion in this way? Put
differently, what can acquiescence in retail justice tell us about police
and prosecutorial preferences and priorities?
Legal scholars tend to assume that prosecutors seek to maximize
either their convictions or conviction rates, often because these are
thought to be the measures by which they are evaluated for promotion
or election.312 The retail justice story challenges this position. Most
shoplifting cases are easy wins for prosecutors—the stolen goods are
recovered and surveillance footage captures the offender in the act.
Plea deals come quickly. Prosecutors fixated on collecting convictions
would be foolish to cut off this flow of easy wins. Likewise, if police
aimed to maximize arrests, as some maintain, 313 why wouldn’t they
push hard against, rather than encourage, an arrangement that steals
easy ones out from under their gaze?
What retail justice suggests instead is something like a crimecontrol model of prosecutorial and police behavior. As long as they’re
assured that retailers are taking care of the problem, and not allowing
thieves to run rampant through their stores, prosecutors and police
seem generally content to focus their attention and resources on other
problems. Again, this is not because there aren’t arrests to be made
and convictions to be counted—there are (and cheap ones). But the
resources are better spent elsewhere.
This behavior seems less
consistent with a conviction-(rate-) or arrest-maximizing hypothesis
than with models in which the goal is to maximize social welfare or
deterrence subject to a budget constraint.314
See Harel, supra note __, at 1207-08 (discussing an “equal costs” model for
distribution of protection).
312 See supra note __.
313 See supra note __.
314 See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 289, 295-96 (1983). It’s also consistent with a model in which law
enforcement authorities maximize both social welfare and their own career
prospects. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An
311
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C. The Next Frontiers
Recall CEC’s ultimate vision: “to reinvent the way crimes are
handled, starting with retail theft.” If retail theft is just the beginning
for the industry, what’s next? Put another way, what characteristics of
the retail setting have fostered these private justice institutions, and
are there other settings that share the same traits? Several conditions,
it seems to me, conduce to the particular model of “offender-funded”
private justice the retail justice companies embody. The claim is not
that each of these conditions is strictly necessary on its own, but rather
that, the more that are satisfied, the more likely it is that “offenderfunded” private justice will work.
First, the stakes are low in the typical shoplifting case—the average
take is $129. 315 This allows retail justice companies to extract fees
sufficiently high to deter future thefts and thus protect victim and
third-party interests. Given offenders’ solvency limits, the same is
unlikely to be true for more serious crimes. 316 Moreover, because
retailers at least partly internalize the risks of recidivism, they are
unlikely to opt for private justice where it would underdeter;317 police
and prosecutors would be less likely to step aside in such a case as well.
Second, shoplifters are typically nonviolent. Were the contrary true,
private justice companies might be more reluctant to take responsibility
for suspects because of physical safety risks to their employees and
potential future victims.318 Any concerns about underdeterrence would
be heightened as well.
Third, shoplifting has identifiable victims, in contrast with so-called
“victimless” crimes like drug use or prostitution. Victims are the most
obvious candidates to initiate the private-justice process.319 Moreover,
shoplifting victims often know who the offenders are. I don’t mean
“often” in an absolute sense, if it’s true that shoplifters are apprehended
only one time in forty-eight. But where an offender’s identity will ever
be known, the chances are high the victim knows it through in-store

Analysis of the Federalization of Drug Crimes, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 259, 288
(2000). Sticking it to shoplifters probably never made any cop or prosecutor’s
career.
315 See Rainey & Hobbs, supra note __.
316 See Landes & Posner, supra note __, at 42; Levmore & Fagan, supra note __,
at 13, 15.
317 See supra __.
318 See Brown, supra note __, at 1940.
319 See Landes & Posner, supra note __, at 32 (discussing the need for a system
of bounties to create incentives for private enforcement of laws prohibiting
“victimless” crimes).
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surveillance—only infrequently will police investigation supply the
information.320
Fourth, a relatively small number of victims each suffers a huge
number of thefts. This reduces transaction costs by allowing private
justice companies to profit from contracting with a few major clients.
Were the number of incidents much lower and dispersed among victims,
not only would transaction costs rise, but also private justice companies
might need to raise enrollment fees. This would reduce the rate at
which suspects enrolled, as private justice became unaffordable or, at
the least, less appealing relative to the criminal justice system. It
might also heighten the sense that private justice companies are
exploiting suspects, attracting state attention.
Finally, shoplifting victims have few appealing options for
sanctioning offenders other than calling the police. “Offender-funded”
private justice is, in a sense, a method of outsourcing sanctions. In
some settings, the nature of the relationship between offender and
victim will allow for flexible and tailored (nonlegal) sanctions internal
to the relationship. This is not the case for retailers and their armslength customers.
Where else, then, might these conditions be present? The retail
setting itself supplies one obvious example, as shoplifting is not the only
prevalent form of retail theft. Theft by employees only narrowly trails
shoplifting as the leading source of inventory shrinkage.321 The average
take is higher for employees than shoplifters,322 which might suggest
the need for a higher fee to achieve adequate deterrence. At the same
time, the employment relationship allows the employer to monitor its
employees especially closely, achieving some deterrence through means
other than the fee.
It’s possible that many retailers prefer to use job-related sanctions—
such as demotions, job transfers, or pay reductions—to punish
employees who steal. This could explain why CEC’s employee-targeted
program appears to be slow to launch.323 But it’s also not implausible to
Cf. id. at 31-32.
See HOLLINGER & NAT’L RETAIL FED’N, supra note __, at 9.
322 See Rainey & Hobbs, supra note __ ($715).
323 CEC seems to be trying to penetrate the employment market. In 2014, the
company announced a program called “CEC Return” to help retailers address
employee theft. See CEC, Corrective Education Company Announces CEC Return,
a Restorative Justice Education Program That Addresses Employee Theft,
MARKETWIRED (Oct. 13, 2014, 09:22AM), http://www.marketwired.com/pressrelease/Corrective-Education-Company-Announces-CEC-Return-RestorativeJustice-Education-1956856.htm. There is little information available about CEC
Return. In 2016, the company then premiered a program called “CEC Retain,” “an
employee engagement offering used to prevent employee theft and more fully
engage new employees.” See Corrective Education Company (CEC) Expands Its
320
321
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imagine employers that would prefer to keep discipline separate from
the terms and conditions of employment, to maximize the chances of
restoring and preserving a successful employment relationship.
Another example might be a landlord who oversees a large number
of rental units in an urban setting. The landlord, just by the odds,
likely encounters all sorts of nonviolent, low-level offenses on her
properties, including drug use (or distribution) and noise violations.
Doing nothing may be unappealing, as these crimes likely depress
rental values, making the landlord a “victim” of even so-called
“victimless” crimes. Calling the police, as in the retail environment,
may be time-consuming, ineffectual, and frightening to current or
prospective tenants. Eviction is surprisingly expensive.324 Compared to
these more traditional options, an “offender-funded” model of private
justice has a certain appeal.
There is also the possibility of a different, plausible model of forprofit private justice. Instead of outsourcing sanctions, private justice
could outsource adjudication. Consider two examples. University
disciplinary committees frequently adjudicate student crimes
committed on campus—from the mundane, like vandalism, to the
explosive, like sexual assault.325 The school’s continuing relationship
with its students makes available sanctioning mechanisms—like
academic probation or suspension—that may be preferable to what an
external provider (including a court) can offer. If, however, a private
justice company can adjudicate cases more efficiently, schools might
pay them to handle this part of the process.
Likewise, many employers—not just retailers battling employee
theft—handle on-the-job crimes in-house. 326 It’s possible that some

Product Line and Sales Team, CEC (June 16, 2016, 6:28AM),
https://www.correctiveeducation.com/home/blog/corrective-education-company-cecexpands-its-product-line-and-sales-team.
324 See, e.g., Lucas Hall, The True Cost of Eviction Is More than $5,000,
LANDLORDOLOGY (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.landlordology.com/cost-to-evict-atenant; see also MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED 114 (2016) (pegging cost at $600 in
low-income areas of Milwaukee in 2008-2009).
325 See, e.g., Collin Binkley et al., College Disciplinary Boards Impose Slight
Penalties for Serious Crimes, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 23, 2014,
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2014/11/23/campus-injustice.html
(“Colleges … use campus disciplinary boards to pass judgment on students accused
of violent crimes, including rape and assault. Sometimes, schools handle crime and
punishment without ever reporting violations to police. Most cases never go to
court.”); see id. (discussing cases involving trespassing, theft, and property
destruction).
326 See, e.g., C.D. SHEARING & P.C. STENNING, PRIVATE SECURITY AND PRIVATE
JUSTICE: THE CHALLENGE OF THE 80S 31 (1983) (“Systems which have been
established within industry and commerce for disciplining workers are the epitome
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would prefer to outsource adjudication, and then impose job-related
sanctions on those found guilty. Of course, nothing would stop an
employer (or university) from outsourcing both adjudication and
sanctions. The decision presumably would turn on a comparison of the
sanctioning alternatives, likely focusing on cost-effectiveness, including
consequences for the future of the relationship.
CONCLUSION
Legal scholars long have focused on the role of police and
prosecutors as gatekeepers for the criminal justice system. 327 How
these actors exercise their discretion determines who escapes the
criminal justice system’s net and who is entangled within it. This
Article highlights how late to the game police and prosecutors can be—
the stationhouse phone rings only when the private gatekeepers that
precede them place the call. In these settings, the question is not
whether an individual suspected of crime will enter the justice system,
but rather which justice system—public or private—will assess his guilt
and administer any necessary sanctions.

of … ‘systems of private justice’ and are increasing supplanting the criminal justice
process … as the means of dealing with crime in industry.”).
327 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 TEMP
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 369, 369 (2010) (describing prosecutors as the “key
gatekeepers who ration criminal justice”); J.J. Prescott & Charlie Gerstein, Process
Costs and Police Discretion, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 268, 272, 276-78 (2015)
(describing how police exercise of the discretionary power to arrest shapes criminal
justice outcomes).

